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ABSTRACT

EMPLOYMENT DURATION AND ATTRITION OF FEDERAL AND STATE
INSPECTORS GENERAL IN THE UNITED STATES
by
FRANK CHEN

Advisor: Ned Benton

A recent report by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) on inspector
general (IG) attrition found growing rates of IG vacancies within federal Offices of Inspectors
General (OIGs) (Johnson, 2018). This study identified the growing rates of Acting IGs (AIGs)
and their role as interim IGs negatively affect their offices, decreasing productivity, and
increasing difficulty in meeting quality inspection and oversight standards. This dissertation
identified and analyzed rates of IG employment duration and attrition in federal and state offices
of inspectors general (OIG) between 2001 and 2017, starting with a comprehensive review on IG
literature and their responsibilities. A discussion of empirical attrition models, theories, and
outlier case studies followed the literature review to explain the IG attrition problem in detail.
The dissertation’s methodology begins with identifying federal and state IGs separated by their
temporary/permanent status, hire/departure dates, and length of service. Chi-Square, Student’s Ttest, and Correlation tests examined the statistical relationships between identified causal factors
and IG attrition. This dissertation’s methodology also analyzed federal and state OIG statutes to
identify their weaknesses, followed by policy recommendations to reduce IG attrition for
existing and future OIGs.
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CHAPTER

1
The Problem Statement

In March 2018, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) published the report
Inspectors General Information on Vacancies and IG Community Views on Their Impact (GAO
18-270) and analyzed the growing problem with vacancies within OIGs. “As of September 30,
2017, 12 of the 64 active offices of inspector general (OIG) established by the Inspector General
Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act), had IG vacancies” (Johnson, 2018). This raised problems
with management and independence, as 36% of OIG employees believed Acting Inspectors
General (AIGs) instead of permanent Inspectors General (IGs) had a negative impact on
employee morale (Johnson, 2018). Additionally, AIGs also appeared less independent, especially
when they showed interest in ascending to the IG position. Using data gathered from the Council
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and www.congress.gov, the GAO
report 18-270 identified differences between IG vacancies, AIGs, and differences in leadership.
This report’s analysis argued the importance of keeping current IGs and reducing IG attrition,
which would decrease AIGs serving as substitutes for IG positions.
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Under the Inspector General Act of 1978, along with its 2008 and 2016 amendments, 64 OIGs
were established (along with 64 IGs) as of 2018. The major legislative adjustments to the IG Act
of 1978 are the IG Reform Act of 2008 and the IG Empowerment Act of 2016. The United States
President appoints half of these IGs while the federal agency head appoints the second half, with
the appointment decision depending on the size of the agency. Designated federal entity IGs
(DFE) are customarily smaller agencies established by commissions, board, authorities,
endowments, foundations, institutions, and other administrations identified by the IG Act (Davis,
2014). Agency heads appoint DFEs to smaller agencies such as commissions, foundations, and
government entities. The federal IGs do not serve terms in office (with the exception of U.S.
Postal Service OIG and U.S. Capitol Police OIG) and usually stay in the position even when
presidential terms change (Rosenberg, 2017).

As of September 30, 2017, there were many IG vacancies within the federal OIGs. For example,
the Department of the Interior had an IG vacancy since 1/1/2012 (six years) and the Department
of Defense had an IG vacancy since 1/10/2016 (two years). When IGs quit, the Federal
Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 requires the First Assistant or Deputy Inspector General to
become the AIG for the OIG. According to GAO 18-270 report’s findings, AIGs appeared to
have a negative impact on employee morale and carrying out strategic plans to improve the OIG.
An OIG employee stated, “An acting IG is a caretaker, someone internal who is expected to
maintain the status quo. Therefore, having an acting IG in place for an extended period may have
delayed the implementation of reforms or bold changes that would normally be expected from
new leadership” (Johnson, 2018, p. 24). This raises the importance of reducing IG attrition in
OIGs.
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AIG positions have negative impacts on employee morale and leadership while also become less
independent. In the GAO report 18-270, GAO surveyed 52 permanent IGs on their opinion on
Deputy IGs’ independence and found that AIGs are less independent in comparison to permanent
IGs, especially when applying for IG positions.

According to a permanent IG, “Generally speaking, the position of Inspector General would be a
desirable promotion for an acting IG (sometimes the Deputy IG). An acting/Deputy IG,
interested in the IG position and striving to impress the agency leadership/White House for
consideration of the IG job, could be less aggressive (independent) in an effort to please the
‘hiring official’ (agency head/White House)” (Johnson, 2018, p. 29). This change in the AIG’s
behavior to please their hiring official may affect them while they carry out their job
responsibilities. Permanent IGs are less likely to please their hiring official and can be as
aggressive as they need to carry out their job duties. Other permanent IGs disagreed and stated
that background, character, and experience drives independence and not a permanent title. 49 out
of the 52 IGs agreed to answer this question. 30 IGs believed that AIGs are less independent
while 13 believed that they are independent. The remaining six IGs responded to this survey
question with “No basis for Judgment.” In sum, AIGs are not viable substitutes for IG positions.
There must be a new IG to fill vacant IG positions and OIGs should take measures to improve IG
attrition.

Federal AIGs serving for extended periods is not only a problem at the federal level but also on
the state jurisdictional level. Although no readily available research or reports emphasize the
damages or problem of state IG attrition, the concerns are similar. “Ensuring a competent, well-
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trained, and motivated workforce remains a critical challenge across government. This challenge
continues to intensify as employees in key positions increasingly become eligible to retire, are
lost through attrition, or migrate to other business opportunities” (CIGIE, 2007).

The aforementioned research on AIGs are about federal AIGs and not state AIGs. As of early
2018, research on state IG attrition remains quiet and this absence of research does not mean it is
not a problem. A possible explanation for why there is no research on state IG attrition is because
the idea of IG attrition is new and only recent. Research on this subject at the federal level has
started in early 2018. State IG reports rarely recognize or identify IG attrition as a problem and
extensive internet searches on this subject matter reveal no result. In short, this dissertation
project will expand current research on federal IG attrition while also exploring IG attrition and
duration in the state jurisdiction. In future research outside the borders of this dissertation will
analyze county and city IG attrition to determine similar attrition factors between federal, state,
county, and city IGs; for examples, OIG funding and subpoena powers. New research on federal
and state IG attrition will update this dissertation beyond its completion and publication.

This dissertation project will answer the following research questions to solve the IG attrition
problem at the federal and state levels in the United States.

1. What are the measures of employment duration and attrition of inspectors general, as
measured by standard metrics of employee retention and position turnover?
2. What legislative, functional and structural attributes of inspector general offices, and the
agencies they oversee, are associated with different rates of employment duration and attrition?
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3. Are there policy measures that might improve inspector general employment duration, attrition
and agency performance outcomes?

5

CHAPTER

2
Literature Review

This literature review consists of three major parts – IGs, attrition, and conceptual explanations
for IG attrition. The first part explains the IG concept, the IG Act of 1978, the 2008 and 2016
amendments to the IG Act, OIG organizational structure, responsibilities of IGs, and OIG
performance outcomes. The second part explains attrition, the costs of attrition, and attrition
measurement models. The third part discusses empirical theories and case studies that would
explain IG attrition. The end of this literature review will combine the three parts and explain the
IG attrition problem. The completed literature review will fully explain the methods to measure
IG attrition in Chapter 3 – Methodology. This dissertation topic is different from other IG related
topics because it moves beyond only measuring OIG structure and appointment processes and
uses them to explain IG employment duration and attrition. Before analyzing IG attrition, the
literature review will begin with the inspector general concept.
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The Inspector General concept started as early as 1668, designated by King Louis XIV to inspect
the conditions of his army. In 1777, the Second Continental Congress appointed Thomas
Conway, the first IG in the Continental Army to ensure appropriate dollar spending for military
rations and ammunitions. In 1778, Friedrich William von Steuben replaced Conway due to his
constant disputes with his Commander-in-Chief, George Washington. Since Steuben’s
appointment, he has been the “Father of the Inspector General system” and the IG concept has
remained the same. Between 1778 until now, the IG concept remained focused on efficient
federal spending, and to date has expanded its responsibilities over to combating fraud, waste,
and abuse. OIGs are not required by statute to combat corruption but have a special focus on
corruption depending on their jurisdiction.

IG focus on corruption varies by jurisdiction but usually perceived as a local concern. “Fighting
corruption in America tends to be seen as a local concern, with the important exception of the
prosecutors and federal agenda under the U.S. Department of Justice (CAPI, 2016). Depending
on the jurisdiction, OIGs turn corruption cases over to special offices designed specifically for
corruption cases. For example, Texas and New Jersey have anti-corruption state police units
while Maryland has a state prosecutor office designed for combating corruption (CAPI, 2016).
There were also state OIGs that were specifically created to combat corruption; for example, the
Massachusetts OIG in 1981 was created in response to corruption in public construction
contracts. In short, each state has their own method to handle corruption cases that often requires
the assistance of anti-corruption offices.
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Until the U.S. President appointed the first federal agency IG in 1962 for the U.S. Department of
Agriculture Administrative OIG, the IG concept remained quiet and informal. In 1976, the U.S.
President appointed the first federal IG at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) (Nowolinski, 2001). The first HEW IG, Thomas Morris was responsible for auditing,
investigating, and supervising agency programs and submitted annual reports to Congress. The
HEW OIG led to the creation of many other OIGs and to the creation of the Inspector General
Act of 1978.

The Inspector General Act of 1978 appoints and requires federal IGs to conduct and manage
audits and investigations, to serve as an agency leader and to recommend best practices to
promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in combating fraud, waste, and abuse.
Additionally, all federal IGs must report to congress of all activities and challenges throughout
their service. According to this Act, IGs are also responsible for monitoring and assuring the
highest levels of accountability throughout their service. As better defined by the current
Department of Defense AIG Glenn Fine, “The primary mission of IGs is to detect and deter
waste, fraud, and abuse, and to promote economy, efficiency, and integrity within their agencies.
IGs pursue this mission by conducting audits, evaluations, investigations, and special reviews
relating to agency personnel and programs” (Fine, 2016). In sum, simply accomplishing these
objectives only satisfies the bare minimum as an IG.

The President appoints federal IGs with advice and consent of the Senate based only on the
appointee’s demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, law, management, and investigations.
The President can also remove IGs from office with written explanation for reasons doing so.
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Assisting the IG in carrying out their job responsibilities, they must appoint an Assistant IG for
Auditing, and Assistant IG for Investigations to supervise audits and investigations of the OIG.
Each year, with the Assistant IG for Auditing and Assistant IG for Investigations, the IG, by
April 30 and October 31 every year, must submit semiannual reports that detail every activity by
the OIG between the six-month periods. In addition to submitting semiannual reports, IG must
also submit a budget estimate to the President to specify the required funds to continue OIG
operations. The budget estimates as submitted to Congress by the President for every federal IG
(Inspector General Act of 1978). Similarly, agency head IG appointments started since the IG
Act amendment of 1988, which also requires the DFEs to share the same responsibilities as IGs
appointed by the president (Davis, 2014). This chapter will further discuss the roles and
responsibilities of DFE IGs.

In 2008, the Inspector General Reform Act improved the 1978 Inspector General Act by
including eligibility requirements for future IGs such as meeting accounting, auditing, and
investigation skill requirements. The Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 also requires the
President or agency chiefs to explain the removal of a federal IG, increasing the pay rate of all
IGs, and notably, the establishment of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (CIGIE). In 2016, The Inspector General Empowerment Act amended the 1978 Act
by strengthening IG independence, allowing IGs to perform investigations without approval from
agency heads, streamlining CIGIE investigation processes, greater transparency, and access to
documents for audits and investigations. “For appointed watchdogs, independence is essential to
assure that watchdogs are willing to exercise their audit and investigative resources without fear
of retribution or retaliation” (Feldman, 2013 p. 257).
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“The IG Act also provides specific protections to IG independence, including a prohibition on
the ability of the agency head to prevent or prohibit the IG from initiating, carrying out, or
completing any audit or investigation” (Kepplinger, 2009). The amended IG Act also provides
IGs with a “safety net” when removed from office. IGs removed from office would remain a
member of the Senior Executive Service and paid at least 20% more than the $100,000 annual
salary for a GS-15 (Feldman, 2017). Feldman references an IG characterizing this protection as
placing all the removed IGs into the “go-to-hell” club because IGs pressured into resigning may
still respond knowing that they will maintain a salary to support their families (2017).

As the IG profession grew, 1978 IG Act responded with amendments as well as some of its
initial responsibilities. Instead of only combating fraud, waste, and abuse, IGs eventually became
responsible for combating corruption as well since the 1970s. “One of the few recourses in place
to investigate and expose corruption at federal agencies is inspectors general—independent,
nonpartisan watchdogs who play a major role in uncovering and preventing abuse, fraud, and
taxpayer waste” (Levin, 2018). To date, no official legislation requires IGs to combat corruption,
although IGs can and already do so as a part of their profession. For example, IGs have unique
access to government systems and files with the ability to request information if not readily
available. IGs also have special knowledge on the government unit they are monitoring, which
will allow them to detect corruption easier than other entities. Lastly, their presence alone makes
it easier to receive corruption complaints. In short, although not clearly stated in OIGs’
organizational structure, IGs are responsible for combating corruption in addition to fraud, waste,
and abuse (McConnell, 2011).
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OIGs’ organizational structures vary between federal, state, county, and local jurisdictions. OIGs
establishment methods also vary across jurisdictions but follow similar guidelines as
recommended by the Association of Inspectors General (ASIG). The ASIG is a non-profit
membership organization for agencies and professionals in the inspector general/inspection and
oversight community. The ASIG’s mission is to promote “excellence in the inspector general
community by establishing and encouraging adherence to quality standards, sponsoring
professional development and networking opportunities, certifying individuals in IG-specific
disciplines, supporting offices in governmental and external relations, and inspiring
governmental entities to embrace the inspector general model as an effective tool in the fight to
combat waste, fraud and abuse” (ASIG, n.d.). Since its establishment on October 26, 1996, it has
created an inspector general community with more than 2,000 members working in an audit,
investigation, or oversight profession. The ASIG also created the ASIG’s Principles and
Standards for Offices of Inspectors General (Green Book), which illustrates the highest quality
standards required to meet OIG mission, goals, and objectives. As recommended by the ASIG’s
Green Book, OIGs are established as a legal entity by statute or executive order. The statute
details the OIG’s mandate, powers, authority, staff qualifications, OIG independence, and
whistleblower protection.

There are multiple ways to meet OIG missions, such as conducting audits, investigations, and
evaluations to identify and prevent criminal behavior and misconduct. Other approaches include
fraud control programs or operational surveys. Regardless of the types of methods used to meet
OIG missions, IGs must be independent, free from personal and external impairments, as it may
cause biases that would affect the objectivity of their performance.
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OIGs should also develop a strategy that considers and analyzes the OIG’s jurisdiction, which
plays a critical role in budget, roles, risks, staff, and vulnerabilities. Since OIGs operate under
minimal resources, they must strategize their approaches on combating fraud, meeting the needs
and interests of the OIG, and analyzing OIG review outcomes. In respective to fraud, OIGs
should also strategize to prevent fraud, by implementing more staff training programs, review of
OIG reports for trends and review on initial designs of new programs.

In addition to developing strategic plans, setting goals and objectives, IGs are responsible for
organizing the OIG to ensure efficient use of resources. The Association’s Principles and
Standards for Offices of Inspectors General states “The OIG organizational structure should
foster coordinated, balanced, and integrated accomplishment of the OIG mission, goals, and
objectives” (ASIG, 2014). IGs can focus the OIG’s mission onto different areas such as fraud
prevention, investigations, risk assessments, internal controls, etc. IGs should also control OIG
operations to appropriately supervise all activities, ensure quality control, and periodically assess
accomplishments supported by a strategic plan. In sum, all actions taken should help meet the
OIG goals and objectives.

Depending on the governmental jurisdiction, different parties appoint IGs. According to the
Association of Inspectors General’s Model Legislation for the establishment of Offices of
Inspector General, “The Inspector General shall be appointed by (the governor with the advice
and consent of the senate), (the governor), (the legislature), (or a high ranking government
official with a position equal to or higher than an agency head)” (2002). IGs should be appointed
based on integrity, their skills in accounting, auditing, criminal justice, investigations, or other
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relevant fields of study. Appointed IGs should also earn the designation Certified Inspector
General® shortly after their appointment as IG. IGs serve five-year terms and their appointing
authority can remove them with explanation.

As outlined in the Inspector General Act, there are two main appointment types for federal IGs
(out of five) – presidential appointed IGs and approved by the Senate (PAS) and designated
federal IGs (DFE). The other three federal appointment types are 1) appointment by the president
with Senate consent and enacted under a separate authority, 2) appointment by the president
alone or with Senate consent and under a separate authority, and 3) appointment by agency head,
enacted under separate authority and is in the legislative branch. Regardless of appointment type,
federal IG appointments, procedure, structure, and terms are all different (Ginsberg, 2016).

There are notable differences between PAS and DFE IGs, some of which include the following:
appointment type, budget, legal counsel, and selection process. The biggest difference is the
appointment, termination, or transfer approval. The president appoints PAS IGs with approval
from the Senate while agency heads appoint DFE IGs. The PAS IG appointment process is
perceived as a two-step process while the DFE appointment process is a multi-member board
process (Kempf, 2018). “Agencies headed by multi-member boards are considered more
independent and less vulnerable to regulatory capture because their members should, in theory,
provide diverse points of view” (Kempf, 2018). Another difference is the source of budget.
Budgets for DFE OIGs come from the agency’s budget process while PAS OIGs’ budget comes
from a separate appropriations account within the budget request to Congress. Lastly, some of
the PAS OIGs have law enforcement authority.

13

The IG Act authorized 24 of the PAS OIGs to have law enforcement authority. Since 2014, 39
OIGS have law enforcement authority with eight of the 39 as DFE OIGs. Law enforcement
authority includes the following as outlined by the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Offices of
Inspectors General with Statutory Law Enforcement Authority (CIGIE, 2014).
1) Carry a firearm while engaged in official duties.
2) Make an arrest without a warrant for any federal offense in presence of an agent or when
the agent has probable cause to believe the person to be arrested is committing a federal
felony.
3) Seek and execute federal warrants for arrest, search of premises, or seizure of evidence
under the authority of the United States.
According to the Attorney General guidelines for law enforcement authorities, the Inspector
General, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, and special agents assigned under the
Inspector General qualify for law enforcement authority. Failure to comply with the Attorney
General guidelines would cause the IG and their office to lose law enforcement authority. Law
enforcement authority requires the eligible OIG staff to complete the Basic Criminal Investigator
Training Program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (OAG, 2003). The OIG will
also provide additional training courses to ensure their staff is current on their physical combat
abilities and understanding to use deadly force. The Attorney General also authorizes the OIG
staff to carry a firearm, make arrests while under official duties, and seek and execute warrants
under probable cause. OIG staff can also carry their firearms outside of official duty for safety
reasons as authorized by the Inspector General. The methodology chapter in this dissertation will
analyze the law enforcement authority and IG attrition.
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DFE and PAS IGs can also have their own attorney when political pressures become too
difficult. The IG counsel represents the OIG and IG in personnel and compliance matters,
provides legal advice and support in audits and investigations, and can appear in court on behalf
of the OIG and its staff. DFE IGs can obtain legal counsel from an attorney appointed by the IG
while PAS IGs must receive legal advice from an attorney under civil service laws. DFE IGs can
also obtain legal counsel from an attorney that appointed by and reporting to another IG or an
attorney that is on the CIGIE (Burrows, 2009). Employee selection processes are different
between PAS and DFE IGs, with DFE OIGs usually having smaller offices. There is also the
perception that PAS IG positions are more attractive or unattractive to candidates because the
president would appointment them instead of an agency head. “The PAS process ensures that
potential appointees are subject to more extensive ethical and political scrutiny, and IGs
appointed under the PAS process may have greater credibility than their agency head appointed
counterparts” (Burrows, 2009). Lastly, PAS OIGs appear more productive than DFE OIGs
(Kempf, 2018).

Not all DFEs have OIGs. In 2014, Congress had a budget threshold of $100 million to determine
which DFE should have IGs (Davis, 2014). Under Davis’ study, there were concerns on creating
small OIGs within DFEs with limited resources and unqualified staff. Regardless of resources,
Congress makes final decision to appoint IGs to DFEs. Davis recommended as a remedy for
DFEs without IGs that “on a case-by-case basis, that specific small agencies could benefit by
obtaining IG oversight from another agency’s IG office where the missions of the two agencies
are somewhat similar” (2014). This case-by-case basis is already in practice. For examples, the
Department of State oversees the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the Agency for
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International Development has oversight over the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the U.S.
African Development Foundation, the Inter-American Foundation, and the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (Davis, 2014). In short, an alternative to provide oversight to DFEs
without appointment IGs due to budget constraints is to give a similar DFE IG the oversight
authority on a case-by-case basis. The policy recommendation chapter in this dissertation will
further discuss DFE appointment processes.

To decrease the differences between PAS and DFE IGs, Burrows recommended converting DFE
IGs to PAS IGs. “There are several approaches that Congress could pursue—(1) taking no
action; (2) converting some DFE IGs into PAS positions; (3) converting all DFE IGs into PAS
positions; or (4) converting some or all DFE IGs into PAS positions but including a sunset
provision” (2009). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2002 report explained how the
conversion of DFE IGs to PAS IGs would be a smart move because it would improve
independence, efficiency, and effectiveness of the offices. Regardless of a conversion or not, the
differences between PAS and DFE IGs might be significant enough to explain IG vacancy rates.

Converting DFE IGs to PAS IGs is not an original concept. Congress has already attempted to
convert DFE IGs to PAS IGs because it may conceptually increase independence. As defined by
the Government Auditing Standards,
“In all matters relating to the audit work, the audit organization and the individual
auditor, whether government or public, must be free from personal, external, and
organizational impairments to independence, and must avoid the appearance of such
impairments to independence. Auditors and audit organizations must maintain
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independence so that their opinions, findings, conclusions, judgments, and
recommendations will be impartial and be viewed as impartial by objective third parties
with knowledge of the relevant information.”

Similarly, Kepplinger defines independence as the ability to remain objective and maintain an
independent attitude during an audit as well as recognized by others that the auditor is
independent. The independent attitude is also known as intellectual honesty (2009). Kepplinger
believes “that the differences in the appointment and removal processes between presidentially
appointed IGs and those appointed by their agency heads result in a clear difference in the level
of independence of the IGs” (2009). At one point in time, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation had weak independence and as a result, Congress converted this DFE OIG into PAS
OIG. Another agency that Congress also converted from DFE to PAS was the Tennessee Valley
Authority. In short, Congress understands the importance and benefits of converting DFE to PAS
OIGs to increase IG independence.

Independence is difficult to maintain because of external pressures or presidential influences on
the IGs. According to Kempf, presidents can signal their expressions on OIG operations and
depending on the president’s philosophy and pressure, they impose pressure on an OIG, causing
the IG to less likely conduct audits and investigations (2018). Regardless of the IG Act providing
independence protection, any weakness in independence will eventually reduce efficiency of the
office. Kempf’s research also found that depending on the presidential administration, there
appears to be a decrease in audits and investigations. For example, the OIGs sampled in Kempf’s
research shows that they were less productive during the Obama administration in comparison to
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the Bush administration. Additionally, “IG turnover is related to increased productivity with
regard to audits but decreased productivity with regard to investigations” (2018). Regardless of
the jurisdiction IGs are responsible for, they must all maintain independence, as well as many of
the aforementioned factors. The sections below describe the differences between state and local
IGs.

There are subtle but notable differences between state and local IGs. Typically appointed by
governors with legislative consent, State IGs focus on employee misconducts, ethics violations,
and contract misappropriations (Feldman, 2013) According to Daniel Feldman and David
Eichenthal, the role of the state IGs is to serve as a lie detector for individuals that lie on their
resumes, job applications, and contract award dollars. This oversimplified responsibility comes
with its challenges, such as practical, legal, political, and cultural factors that can all limit the
oversight abilities and powers of the IG (Feldman, 2017). ”As of 2011, more than half of all
states have an OIG. 11 of these states are not statewide OIGs but are rather OIGs for Medicaid or
Health and Human Resources; for example, the Texas Health and Human Resources OIG.
Although they are not statewide OIGs, they are also well resourced and have a unique
partnership between state and federal government” (Feldman, 2013). In sum, state IGs share
similar the responsibilities and follow the same standards and challenges as federal IGs by sitting
on a two-legged stool and reporting to two masters while remaining independent.

The responsibilities of local IGs are similar to state IGs, where they report to two masters as
well. According to Salkin on local OIGs, “The office of inspector general is typically created
with two different but related purposes aimed at the common goal of restoring faith in local
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government-to detect and reduce both waste and wrongdoing. To reduce waste, inspectors
general are given the mandate to promote the effectiveness and efficiency of the operations of
government entities, as well as the programs they administer” (2012). In 1995, the City of
Yonkers OIG was established and their first IG Philip Zisman reported to the mayor and City
Council. The initial purpose of this OIG was to focus on economy, efficiency, effectiveness in
government while also having broad investigatory powers for investigations. However, Yonkers
did not need another law enforcement unit to combat corruption and instead needed audits. “In
many instances, departmental procedures were antiquated and inefficient, and operations had
never been subject to an external review or evaluation. Thus, there was little objective
information on how effective the city government was in delivering municipal services”
(Zisman, 2004). The Yonkers OIG focused on performance reviews of government operations
and monitoring procurement/municipal contract processes but unfortunately still received
criticism. The local Yonkers newspaper reported that their OIG was not serving as a strong
public watchdog but instead more of a management consultant due to not following the
traditional IG approach of handling employee misconduct and conflicts of interest (Zisman,
2004). This balance between focusing on government efficiency and as a fierce watchdog is a
challenge for all OIGs, with some offices having fewer resources to accomplish the same goals
and objectives.

One of the major differences and challenges at local level OIGs is resources. The level of
resources per municipal OIG depends on their duties, responsibilities, and size of government.
Municipal OIG budgets vary across jurisdictions as well as their budget processes. For example,
the City of New Orleans OIG is required to submit an annual operating budget with proposed
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expenses while the Montgomery County OIG submits a projected budget to the executive and
council for four-year terms. In 2010, the City of Chicago OIG’s budget estimated to $2,170,842,
the City of Yonkers OIG’s budget estimated to $432,487, and Montgomery County OIG’s
budget estimated to $617,717,163 (Salkin, 2012). In short, there is often a big gap between
current level vs demand for resources, impeding on output of the IG. (Feldman, 2013). Although
this is one of the bigger challenges of local IGs, “all watchdogs face the problem of limited
resources and watchdogs who work for the government must often battle against each other
“essential” public functions in the budgeting process.” (Feldman, 2013). In short, local IGs
perform at the highest standards possible similarly to state IGs, given the minimum resources
available. This dissertation will focus on federal and state IGs to establish the status of IG
attrition, leading to a special interest in studying local IGs in future research.

Regardless of the OIGs’ jurisdiction, IGs share the same responsibilities, starting with ensuring
accountability. IGs are also responsible for ensuring accountability, which “is not commonly
associated with invention or novelty or serendipity, but rather with carrying out assignments,
which are more or less specifically defined, honestly, efficiently, effectively, and at minimal
cost” (Light, 1993, p. 13). Under the 1978 IG Act, it combines the three forms of accountability:
Compliance, Performance, and Capacity-based accountability.

Compliance based accountability focuses on employees following rules and regulations.
Performance accountability focuses on improving organization outcomes by rewarding
employees for merit work. Capacity-based accountability focuses on organizational
effectiveness, through training programs, technological improvements, and stewardship. These
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definitions are short and not exhaustive and requires an independent-minded professional, who
understands the service is about doing what’s “right” as opposed to fulfilling personal interests.
Accountability is challenging to monitor and enforce, and to prioritize one form of accountability
over another is another balancing act for IGs. According to Daniel Feldman, “Sometimes there is
pressure on IGs to stress compliance monitoring at the expense of performance monitoring and
capacity-building, and related pressure to stress the investigator side of the office at the expense
of the auditor side” (Feldman, 2013, p.114). Other IGs would prioritize performance
accountability because audits on agency efficiency and outcomes often determine the root causes
in problems with resource management and waste. Regardless of IG accountability preferences,
all three forms of accountability affect overall IG leadership.

The inspection and oversight profession requires IGs to be an ethical leader or “a role model who
is credible, trustworthy, and exhibits moral behavior” (Wang, 2015). These role models are also
known as authentic leaders. Avolio, Walumbwa, and Weber’s definition of Authentic Leadership
is “as a sequence of transparent and ethical leader behavior that encourages openness in sharing
information needed to make decisions while accepting input from those who follow” (Olaniyan,
2016). Authentic leadership is similar to Chinese leadership theory and according to Dan
Feldman, the “the three most important factors building binding political leadership to supporters
are guanxi (familial, local, linguistic or other such ties forming the basis for mutually supportive
behaviors), loyalty, and competence” (Feldman, 2017). Guanxi is more than caring for your
colleagues, its one step above having concern for others but rather having a deep understanding
of how others think, their morals and values, and making decisions that unify everyone’s
interests – all of which requires strong morality and character.
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Leadership plays a critical role in the success of failure of an IG. An important characteristic of
an efficient leader is independence. Because of the IG’s unique dual-reporting responsibility to
their agency head and to congress, their job is also known as “straddling a barbed-wire fence”
which requires them to complete their mission objectively and independently. “IGs and the
CIGIE have various reporting requirements to Congress, the attorney general, agency heads, and
the public that provide invaluable insights into agency actions and inactions. IGs must report
suspected violations of federal criminal law directly and expeditiously to the attorney general”
(Rosenberg, 2017). When federal IGs report their findings to their agency head, the agency head
must send the report to Congress in 30 days unaltered but they can also include their comments
to the IG’s findings. IGs, regardless if federal or state, can only report their findings to the
agency head and not to any of their subordinates. As quoted by Glenn Fine, “IGs must be
independent. You will do things that I won’t like. You will do things other members of Congress
won’t like. You will do things the Attorney General won’t like. You won’t be liked. Nobody will
like you. Don’t try to be liked, because it won’t happen” (Fine, 2016).

IGs are disliked for their dual reporting responsibility, especially since their reports focuses on
reporting fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA). FWA falls under the umbrella of white-collar crimes.
“White-collar crimes violate trust and therefore create distrust, which lowers social morale and
produces social disorganization on a large scale” (Sutherland, 1940, p.15). Fraud is using
deception for personal gain, a crime that requires specialized knowledge and premeditation.
“Fraud often is hard to detect, particularly when either contracts are so complex or records are so
disorganized that an IG investigator or auditor cannot understand the operating scheme or cull
enough evidence to convince a U.S. attorney to convene a grand jury to compel testimony”
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(Light, 1994). Waste is poor/misuse use of organization resources. Abuse is overstepping
political power boundaries based on status, rank, or position for personal gain. Corruption is
public service hypocrisy, when elected officials prioritize personal interests that also contradict
public interests, which are the same reasons for their appointment. One of the biggest challenges
of combating FWA is determining current rates and damages of FWA, all of which can leave a
strong or poor impression of IG leadership.

White-collar crimes are difficult to detect and measure. Even if practitioners agreed on an
instrument to measure FWA, the data collection process would present a new challenge, as many
forms of FWA remain unreported. Out of the categories of white-collar crimes, corruption is the
most difficult to measure and combat. According to Frank Anechiarico and James Jacobs,
research does not attempt to calculate or estimate corruption because 1) they are rarely reported
to authorities, 2) there are no statistics on corrupt acts committed by public officials, and 3) the
definition of corruption has changed significantly over time, which up until this point even
includes official and private conduct (1996, p.xiv). Additionally, corruption is challenging to
detect. “The difficulties in detecting corruption, coupled with the term’s changing definition,
make it unwise to speculate as to whether there is more official corruption today than there was
in the past or whether there is more corruption in one city or county than in another. Simply
discovering more corruption in a particular city at a particular time does not mean that corruption
is on the rise; it may indicate only an increased effort to ferret out corruption in that place and at
that time” (Anechiarico, 1996, p.14).
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While combating FWA, IGs encounter the “low hanging fruit” and “big fish” dilemma. IGs who
focus on minor complaints will show activity and small victories but will portray having “an
obsession with small issues that allow the big boys to line their pockets. Such perceptions may
also obscure the real extent of an IG’s independence by creating a false impression that
corruption controls do not apply at the highest levels” (Johnston, 2010). Low hanging fruit can
sometimes lead to the big fish. Low hanging fruit are also faster and easier to uncover in
comparison to their big fish counterparts, which may take months of evaluation that may still end
up as low hanging fruit. Focusing on low hanging fruit impedes the success of an IG, and “for
external or more independent watchdogs, success depends on their ability to apply the
disinfectant of sunlight to the problems identified and to use a combination of political and
communication strategies to achieve reform” (Feldman, 2013, p.35). Success of an IG depends
on their ability to combat FWA and to ensure accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness. “The
ultimate success or failure of an IG office is largely determined by the individual IG placed in
that office and that person’s ability to maintain independence both in fact and appearance”
(Davis, 2014). This raises the question if IGs are successful in meeting their objectives.

Since the early 2000s, IGs were under constant evaluation on their performance to determine if
they were successful in meeting their objectives or if they were worth having around. In 2009,
federal IGs established by the IG Act reported $43.3 billion dollars in potential savings from
their audits and investigations (GAO, 2011). In this 2009 GAO fiscal year report, the reported
return on investment (ROI) was $18 for every IG dollar spent. For the longest time, IG
performance success was measured through ROIs. According to John Hudak and Grace Wallack,
they asserted that the most quantifiable metric of IG performance is ROI (2015). “This basic
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performance, used widely throughout private enterprise to assess the profitability or viability of
firms, business divisions, or individual actors, is widely ignored by government, particularly
congressional budget officials” (Hudak, 2015). Although ROI can measure IG performance, it is
not the best measurement because it focuses on program outputs (dollar value of disallowed
costs) and not program outcomes. Additionally, IGs are often reviewed on program compliance
with quality standards and not on program outcomes (2019). It is the greater emphasis on
program outcomes that improves IG performance and effectiveness, not the dollar values saved
(Francis, 2019). In short, although the most basic measurement (ROIs) for performance is
applied to the work of IGs, it inefficient because it does not measure program outcomes.

IG performance is not only difficult to measure but also difficult to determine. Since the creation
of the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, it required IGs for the executive branch to report their
most serious and biggest performance challenges for the year and is referred as the Top
Management and Performance Challenges (TMPC). IGs must submit TMPV reports to their
agency head 30 days in advance to their submission of their Annual Finance Report or
Performance and Accountability Report (Francis, 2019). According to the CIGIE, a review of 61
federal IG TMPC reports found the most severe challenges to IG performance below (2018).
1) Information Technology Security and Management
2) Performance Management and Accountability
3) Human Capital Management
4) Financial Management
5) Procurement Management
6) Facilities Maintenance
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7) Grant Management
The Information Technology Security and Management challenge encountered difficulties
protecting the federal information technology (IT) systems from cyber-attacks and replacing old
IT equipment with new systems to improve operation effectiveness. “Outdated or obsolete IT
systems can potentially reduce system reliability and affect an agency’s ability to fulfill its
mission” (CIGIE, 2018). Failures to upgrade IT equipment will eventually lead to damage to
national security. The Performance Management and Accountability challenge identified how
OIGs have not used performance data in important decision-making, and their agencies lack
reliable program data and metrics to ensure appropriate resource spending. The lack of
performance data negatively affects OIG programs. For example, the U.S. Department of
Justice’s (DOJ) following programs encountered difficulties combating crime because of their
inability to collect performance data.
1. Federal Bureau of Prison’s Healthcare and Rehabilitation services
2. Drug Enforcement Administration
3. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
In short, important decision-making processes for operations and effectiveness does not use
performance data, causing difficulties in meeting organization objectives. Future research outside
of this dissertation will focus on challenges gathering OIG performance data.

Human Capital Management challenges faced by federal OIGs include but are not limited to
funding and staffing to carry out OIG missions. Keeping highly skilled staff with backgrounds in
cyber security is the biggest challenge for OIGs. Additionally, an OIG’s culture affects how
employees will behave, with some problems including ethical lapses, lack of accountability, lack
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of fiscal responsibility, lack of transparency and communication, resistance to change, and low
morale (CIGIE, 2018). Financial Management challenges include poor financial reporting
systems and improper payments. Procurement Management challenges include poor oversight
over procurement planning, contractor performance, and training of personnel. Lastly, the
Facilities Management and Grant Management focused on staff working conditions,
deterioration of infrastructure, and poor oversight over grant funds. According to the CIGIE,
“many of the challenges were negatively impacted by resource issues, both human and
budgetary, and federal agencies’ failure to use performance-based metrics to assess the success
of their programs and operations” (2018). In short, because federal OIGs do not measure
performance or use performance data important decision-making, it caused the aforementioned
TMPC, resulting in reduced OIG effectiveness.

To address the problem of OIG effectiveness caused by lack of OIG performance data, the
Project on Government Oversight (POGO) has recommended that IGs should have continuous
access to their agency’s data instead of requesting “snap-shot” information for an ongoing
investigation (Hempowicz, 2018). Continuous and live-time access to information will
streamline IG investigations. IGs should also have more access to data analytics software, as
most IGs do not have access to the latest data analytics software nor do they have the qualified
staff to use the data. Without performance measurement tools, staff, and live-time access to
information, IGs will continue to struggle with effectiveness and performance. If OIGs
adequately measured performance, the OIGs can determine if there is loss of productivity
especially during periods of IG vacancy. Future research should focus on OIG performance
during periods of IG vacancy.
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OIG performance is one of the many factors that would affect IG attrition. OIG functional and
structural attributes can also affect IG attrition; for example, an OIG’s investigatory powers. In
CAPI’s research survey on state oversight agencies, they categorized state oversight
investigatory powers into the following (2016):
1) Searches and seizures, public hearings, and subpoena
2) Only public hearings and subpoena
3) Only subpoena
4) No investigative powers
5) No watchdog
State oversight agencies with extensive investigative powers such as searches and seizures,
public hearings, and subpoena include Alabama, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York State,
Ohio, and Virginia. Fifteen states only have public hearings and subpoena power while nineteen
only have subpoena power. The remaining states do not have either investigative powers or state
watchdogs such as North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Conceptually, state OIGs with
weak investigative powers are probably less efficient in carrying out their responsibilities,
leading to state IG attrition. Future research should focus on the extent of investigative powers
that IGs have and if it affects IG attrition.

Another factor that may lead to IG attrition is budget. CAPI’s oversight survey research also
found Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Montana, and Nevada state oversight agencies’ annual budget
costing the most out of their state expenditures (in percentages) in comparison to other states
(2016). Other states with expensive annual budgets include Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, and
Massachusetts. OIGs with weak budgets are less likely to perform better in their audits and
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investigations, which may lead to weak independence and eventually IG attrition. Future
research should focus on the amount of impact budget has on an OIG’s performance and if it
affects IG attrition.

CAPI’s research on state OIGs also ranked state OIGs based on the following seven factors of
effectiveness (2016):
1) Strong legal foundations
2) Broad jurisdiction
3) Safeguard of independence
4) Robust enforcement powers
5) Ample resources
6) Partnerships with complementary institutions
7) Political will
CAPI’s state OIG effectiveness rank system categorized state OIGs into having a strong,
standard, or weak IG model. New York, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Louisiana
were ranked as having a strong IG model. Weak IG models have fewer resources, power
limitations, and narrow mandates, which may lead to IG attrition. Each potential factor that
hinders the work of IGs is unique across each state. For example “Looking across the country,
it’s interesting to note that some small states, like Rhode Island and Hawaii, have relatively
strong oversight systems, while some big states, like Arizona and Michigan, lack them. In
general, oversight systems are more developed in more urbanized states like Florida, Illinois, and
the Northeast, due perhaps to high-profile municipal corruption scandals and more organized
reform movements (CAPI, 2016). Future research should focus on state OIGs with weak IG
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models to narrow down the specific functional and structural attributes that cause IG attrition and
other factors of IG effectiveness. In short, OIG attributes such as budget, effectiveness, or
powers can also affect IG attrition. Before we analyze the problem of IG attrition, we will first
discuss attrition from an academic standpoint.

There are also volumes of academic research on employee attrition. According to Benton, his
definition of attrition tells us that it is “any personnel transaction which results in the vacancy of
a previously filled position, including those where the position is immediately refilled, and those
which result from promotions, disciplinary actions, retirements, and voluntary resignations”
(1988, p.17). Wayne Cascio and John Boudreau separate attrition into two categories –
Voluntary and Involuntary. When an employee voluntarily leaves their position, it is Voluntary
Attrition. When an employer terminates or asks an employee to, it is Involuntary Attrition. Jack
Phillips and Adele Connell identified six applicable employee attrition factors to IGs (2003).
1. Survival as an Issue
2. Productivity Losses
3. Workflow Interruption
4. Loss of Expertise
5. Disruption of Social and Communication Networks
6. Job Satisfaction of remaining employees
7. Lost Image of the Organization

1) Survival as an Issue identifies the problem that very few candidates qualify for IG positions.
Because of scarce candidates, any rate of IG attrition could potentially lead to immediate failure
of an OIG.
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2 and 3) Productivity Losses and Workflow Interruption identifies the problem of having a
productivity gap when IGs suddenly quit, causing problems for current and future audit and
investigation cases.
4) Loss of Expertise focuses on the background experience of the IG, who often have unique
skills to carry out their roles better than other IGs. The sudden loss of a special skill can cause
OIG failure.
5) Disruption of Social and Communication Networks occurs when IGs suddenly quit, causing
disruptions in multi-jurisdictional audits and investigations due to loss of relationships.
6) Job Satisfaction of remaining employees can decrease when not accustomed to working for
their new IG or AIG and can decrease productivity or increase in remaining staff turnover.
Lastly, 7) IGs are also poster children for their OIG, which plays a critical role in maintaining
organization image.

Discussing attrition only conceptually paints a simple understanding of the IG attrition problem.
To understand the IG attrition problem, we will first discuss the costs of attrition, then identify
standardized attrition models, and finally select the proper models to measure IG attrition.
According to Wayne F. Cascio and John W. Boudreau, there are three major cost groups for
attrition. The three major costs of attrition are below.
1. Separation
2. Replacement
3. Training

1) Separation costs are direct costs and can calculate Total Employee Attrition Cost with the
following equation: Exit interview costs + administrative costs related to termination +
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separation pay + unemployment tax. This does not consider indirect costs. Indirect costs can
exceed direct costs as it calculates replacement and training costs which includes administrative
costs, supplies, and personnel time.
2) Some replacement costs include communication of job availability, pre-employment
administrative functions, entrance interviews, testing, staff meetings, and more.
3) Training costs are also very costly and depends on costs with trainers and costs with trainees.
In addition to direct and indirect costs, there are productivity and business costs because of
transitions between former and new employees. These costs include overtime by other staff to
cover the vacancy, costs associated with need for additional help, costs from low employee
morale, costs from loss of profit since departure, and more (Armstrong, 2006). In sum, direct and
indirect costs can hurt an organization especially OIGs since they operate on low budgets.

Armstrong’s turnover research also focuses on turnover measurement methods. He starts with
the explanation of reasons for turnover, which includes the following: more pay, better prospects
(career move), more security, more opportunity to develop skills, better working conditions, poor
relationships with managers/leaders/colleagues, harassment, or personal (Armstrong, 2006, p.
380). Armstrong also identifies the costs of labor turnover, which includes: leaving costs,
recruiting replacements, cost of time, costs related to introducing replacements, training
replacement staff, and loss of input/support from resigned staff (2006, p. 381). More notably,
Armstrong measures turnover through the following models – crude employee attrition /labor
turnover index, survival rate, half-life index, stability index, and length of service analysis
(Armstrong, 2006). All of these models originated from the General Attrition Model.
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The General Attrition Model calculates the rate of attrition by totaling the number of
attrition/turnover incidents per period divided by the average work force size and multiplied by
100 for a percentage. Average work size is determined within a time-period (annually or
monthly). To calculate annual turnover, find the sum of monthly turnover over a 12-month
period. To calculate monthly turnover, find the number of employee turnover within a month
divided by the number of employees in the same month. The General Attrition model cannot
measure IG attrition because there is only one IG position and would not make sense for this
equation because it requires a large workforce size. Additionally, the General Attrition model
calculates monthly turnover and is inapplicable to IGs.

To accommodate average work force size sample challenges, Armstrong’s Crude Employee
Attrition can measure IG attrition as well (Armstrong, 2006). The Crude Employee Attrition
calculates attrition differently from the General Attrition Model by measuring attrition as a
percentage between the number of resigned employees in a time-period and the average number
of employed individuals in the same time-period, instead of the average work force size. This
model can accommodate certain years where OIGs had either mass hiring or extreme budget
cuts.

Armstrong also created the Labor Stability Index model but it excludes employees who have
worked in a job position for more than one year. The equation is the number of employees with
one or more years’ service divided by the number of employees employed at the beginning of the
year and multiplied by 100. The problem with using this model for this dissertation is that it
excludes IGs and AIGs who have served in their positions for less than a year. This model also
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does not include IGs appointed throughout the year. In sum, this model cannot measure IG
attrition.

Armstrong’s third model is the Survival Rate, which analyzes the number of employees at a
particular start date and how many of them still stay with the organization after x amount of
months or years of service. For example, if there are 10 IGs appointed in 2010 and only 7 of
them stayed for the first two years, there is a survival rate of 70%. If only 5 of them stayed for
the third year, the survival rate is 50%. This model traditionally calculates attrition in cohorts,
where everyone starts at the same time. Since IGs are not all appointed in the same month or
cohort, this model cannot measure IG attrition (Armstrong, 2006). Armstrong’s fourth model –
Half-life index, created from the Survival Rate, determines how much time it takes before half
the staff originally hired has resigned. Similar to the Survival Rate, the Half-life index cannot
calculate IG attrition.

Armstrong’s fifth model is the Stability Index and identifies the tendency for longer service
employees to commit to the organization. The Stability Index’s formula is the number employees
with a year’s service or more times 100 divided by the number of employed staff 1 year ago,
which will compute employee continuity in an organization. This model can produce misleading
results “because the index will not reveal the vast different situations that exist in a company or
department with a high proportion of long serving employees, in comparison with one where the
majority of employees are short service” (Armstrong, 2006).
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Armstrong’s sixth model is the Length of Service analysis, which reports attrition by employees’
length of service, the total number of leavers, the average number employed, and the Index of
labor turnover. The Length of Service analysis is practically the “go-to” model for measuring
attrition or at least present attrition rates in a clear and coherent fashion. This model will measure
IG attrition in the methodology section.

Armstrong is not the only author on attrition models. Benton’s attrition research on correctional
officers offers a different perspective on employee attrition. For example, Benton claims that
programs used to target and reduce attrition are often more costly than having no programs.
“Programs to reduce attrition often cost money. Some programs include higher levels of pay,
greater opportunities for participation in post and job assignment decisions, and other changes.
These efforts usually do not come without cost” (Benton, 1988). Benton also claims that
characteristics of retirement plans, promotional incentives, and training programs could all
reduce attrition. The characteristic that really drives attrition is salary, as it must be both
competitive and fair. “Pay must be competitive. If an employee’s skills are marketable at a
higher rate, he or she will be under considerable pressure to change jobs. Pay must be equitable.
If an employee believes that he or she is not receiving fair compensation in relation to others, the
resulting dissatisfaction may ultimately lead to withdrawal from the organization” (Benton,
1988).

Benton measures attrition among three rates: 1) Instability rate, 2) Separation rate, and 3)
Wastage rate. 1) Instability rate is the number of employees who left divided by the number of
employees at the beginning of a time-period. Instability rate cannot calculate IG attrition as IG
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appointment is year-round. 2) Separation rate is the number of employees who left divided by the
average number of employees during the same time-period. This is similar to Armstrong’s Crude
Employee Attrition Rate and cannot calculate IG attrition. Lastly, 3) Wastage rate is the number
of employees who left divided by the number of newly hired employees during the same timeperiod and can calculate IG attrition. The methodology chapter in this dissertation will use
Wastage Rate to calculate IG attrition.

For this dissertation, the models that will analyze attrition are the Crude Employee Attrition
Model, Length of Service analysis, and Wastage Rate. The section below highlights the recent
research findings on federal IG attrition and the lack of research on state IG attrition.

Because of the extensive list of responsibilities that IGs must follow, it is worthwhile to adopt
policies that reduce IG attrition. The Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 and the Inspectors
General Empowerment Act of 2016 are starting points for reducing IG attrition but does not
remedy the problem. The IG attrition is new and unique, as it focuses on employment positions
held by very few qualified individuals, or sometimes, held by no one for years. On July 9, 2018,
the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) established a review group to improve the quality
of the inspector general profession. POGO recommended the demand for strong leadership,
prioritizing major issues of our nation, protecting whistleblowers, and addressed the problem of
IG vacancies. “One of the most glaring problems that needs to be addressed is IG vacancies.
Some IG positions remain vacant for years. Our recommendations emphasize the importance of
the President and Congress making it a priority to fill these positions. Both must be committed to
nominating and vetting qualified candidates who are willing and able to address the nation’s
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major issues” (Hempowicz, 2018). POGO’s review group only focuses on federal OIGs and not
on state OIGs. Although there is some research on federal IG attrition, this is not a popular topic
on the state level.

Research on state OIG attrition is a new topic, as recent research and reports only reflect federal
IG attrition. With extensive research, very few state IG reports only briefly discuss attrition and
barely representing a major concern. For example, the New Jersey OIG’s 2009 Annual Report
briefly mentions attrition with “Since that time, OIG has reduced its annual appropriation by
nearly one million dollars and eliminated full-time positions through attrition in order to reach
required budget reductions, and still each year realized a surplus of funds that is provided back to
the General Treasury funds” (2009). In short, state IG attrition is an unrecognized problem but
still a problem nonetheless. As a result, this dissertation has identified the problem of state OIG
attrition and explored the differences in comparison to federal IG attrition. This dissertation
included state IG attrition as a part of its research sample as simply identifying federal IG
attrition does not hold strong value. The analysis between federal and state OIGs will properly
address the problem of IG attrition, leading to future research on local IG attrition. Federal and
State IG attrition findings will first be separate analyses and then later compared with each other.

Similar to other IG research projects, this dissertation used OIG structure and appointment
processes as explanatory factors to explain and solve the problem of IG attrition. This
dissertation analyzed IG attrition of most federal OIGs and the top three states with the most
state OIG offices – Florida (FL), Illinois (IL), and New York (NY). FL, IL, and NY will be the
first sample sizes for identifying and explaining state IG attrition. Conclusions from the IG
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attrition analysis assisted in recommending policies to improve the IG profession and reduce IG
attrition. As mentioned before, this dissertation does not analyze federal OIGs between State
OIGs; they are two separate analyses with separate results.

Empirical studies on attrition identified the effects of job insecurity, stress, role overload, and
lack of ethical voice as factors for attrition. These factors are sample models and can
conceptually explain IG attrition. Most of the factors Nwagbara identified fall into the turnover
category of job insecurity. As defined by Immaculada Silla, Francisco Gracia, and Miguel Angel
Manas, job insecurity is “powerlessness to maintain desired continuity in a threatened job
situation. “First, job insecurity is commonly accompanied by feelings of unpredictability (Sverke
et al., 2002). In other words, people are uncertain about what their future holds, which makes it
difficult for them to react appropriately (2010, p. 450). Job insecurity negatively affects peoples’
attitudes with work and the feeling of unfair treatment. When there is fair treatment among
employees, they are less likely to feel job insecurity. Reciprocal relationships or exchangement
of favors between employees reduces feelings of job insecurity. IGs treated unfairly with little or
no reciprocal relationships may feel inclined to resign.

Job insecurity also affects job performance, absenteeism but some scholars argue that instead of
driving employees to quit, it may encourage them to work harder and being less absent
(Saufenbiel, 2010, p. 101). According to Thomas Saufenbiel and Cornelius Konig, it is “the fear
of losing one’s job may motivate employees to engage in individual action to actively cope with
the threat” (p. 102). It is a different perspective on what pressure does to employees, and the
thought of working harder under difficult circumstances could instead improve their self-security
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in the work environment. Employees can also fear the sudden change in lifestyle by quitting their
job and that fear may also deter employees from quitting. For example, employees who are
insecure with their job, but also want to quit, may realize that the stress of quitting and having no
alternative may be too overwhelming for them, causing them to stay at their job. In sum, job
insecurity could lead to increased pressure, causing IGs to quit and raising IG attrition rates.

Most job dissatisfaction, employee turnover, and job insecurity studies often identified stress as a
major factor for attrition. “40% of employees believe their jobs are “very” or “extremely”
stressful and at least 26% of employees feel “burned out” at work (Grawitch, 2007, p. 275). The
stress that employees experience at work is either a Hindrance or Challenge Stressor. “A
hindrance stressor can be defined as excessive or undesirable work-related demands that interfere
with an individuals’ work achievement” (Saufenbiel, 2010, p.102). Examples of Hindrance
Stressors are employees have different expectations and goals between each other, unsure and
unclear with job responsibilities, having too much work and cannot meet deadlines, “busy” work
that impedes success or productivity, and personal stressors that are unrelated to work. A
Challenge Stressor is a form of stress that employees experience when trying to achieve or
accomplish work-related goals for personal gain. Employees that are trying to accomplish goals
often find themselves overwhelmed with responsibility, under time pressure, and extreme
workload. Scholars have argued that Hindrance and Challenge Stressors are not unique to each
other but rather different perspectives of stress. For example, office politics can be both a
Hindrance and Challenge Stressor because engaging in politics may produce positive outcomes
and personal gain (Saufenbiel, 2010, p. 112). In sum, Hindrance and Challenge Stressors can
cause IGs to quit.
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Role Overload is the type of pressure when experiencing difficulties meeting job demands, strict
deadlines, and having weak skill requirements for the job. Employees that experience role
overload are unable to meet job demands given the amount of resources available. “Of all the
criticisms I have heard about OIGs – and I believe I’ve heard most of them – lack of timeliness is
the one that resonates with me the most, and the one that is most difficult to address. Sometimes,
inadequate resources, or a relentless and increasing caseload, make it difficult if not impossible
to handle all matters rapidly” (Fine, 2016). According to Jisung Park, Heesun Chae, and Hyun
Jung Kim, “work stress resulting from role overload is the primary reason that high performers
feel job dissatisfaction and leave their current position to work at another firm, despite the
rewards that are offered at their current organization” (2017, p. 619). In short, role overload can
pressure IGs to resign.

“Ethical voice is an individual’s attempt to change (rather than escape) a situation in which they
do not deem ethical in the organization (Hirschman 1970). Feeling psycho- logically safe and
entrusting in the management level are necessary for an individual to be willing to voice their
ethical related concerns” (Wang, 2015, p. 1281). Having an ethical voice is a key characteristic
to being an IG, given the fact that they must report to two masters on the matters they oversee in
an organization regardless of fear of consequences.

On November 30, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security’s IG John Roth resigns due to a
conflict in his ability to release report on the Trump administration’s travel ban. Acting
Homeland Security’s Secretary Elaine Duke claimed that Roth’s report was intended to be
released but with the violation of laws sections censored. Roth attempted to dispute the claims
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that there is a connection between his retirement and the travel ban report and it remained silent
since. Illinois Senator Tammy Duckworth spoke with Roth, and concluded, "If you're going to
invoke a privilege and say that, 'Sorry, we can't discuss that' or 'we can't talk about that because it
goes to the deliberative process,' then what you're doing is you're just shutting down the ability
of the IG to do work," Duckworth said in an interview. "It would be a significant departure that
could really degrade the ability of IGs across government to do their work, which would be
really concerning” (Kopan, 2017). In sum, an ethical voice can take many forms, and regardless
of the circumstances, it could lead to IG attrition.

Most IG resignation cases will fall under Thomas Lee and Terence Mitchell’s Unfolding Model,
where employees experience different thought processes before they decide to resign. “The
unfolding model (Lee & Mitchell, 1994) is a retrospective, classiﬁcatory account of voluntary
turnover that treats quitting as a decision process” (Morrell, 2007). This decision process has
three main features: 1) Image Theory, 2) “shock and script” and 3) people resign in five distinct
ways (Path 1, 2, 3, 4a, 4b). Image Theory claims that any conflicts in principles, goals, and
methods used to achieve goals, results in Image Violation, which leads to job dissatisfaction.
Images in Image Theory and Image Violation are visions and goals that employees want to
achieve, the values it preserves, and how they will be obtained. Weak image is what leads to the
path decisions of the Unfolding Model. In sum, Image Theory is the systematic decision making
process that employees experience before they decide their time and circumstance to resign
(Morrell, 2007).
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Resignations fall under either the “shock” or the “script” category. The shock category is when
employees suddenly experience an event (mostly unpleasant), prompting an employee to search
for a new job or to quit abruptly. The script category is when employees premeditate their
decision to quit. Some of the paths in this model often first encounter a shock, which then leads
to a script to resignation. IG voluntary attrition will also fall under either the shock or the script
category.

The five paths are 1) The Pre-determined Script, 2) Push Factors, 3) Pull Factors, 4a) Quit Job
Impulsively, and 4b) Job Search then Quit. Each of the four paths in the Unfolding Model leads
to employee resignation but for different reasons. The first three paths start with a shock, leading
to a script. The Pre-determined Script (path 1) is when an employee experiences a shock but
already has a plan to leave. This shock can be a life-changing event and is not always a harmful
experience or related to job dissatisfaction. Dissatisfied employees will have a plan to leave
because they have been in a similar situation before, where they felt job insecurity, role overload,
or any of the ideologies identified earlier and have already thought of a plan to quit, usually
because they have done so in the past. The Push Factors (path 2) is when employees have done
some self-reflections after the result of a shock, and realized that their current position is not
where they want to stay. The difference between path 1 and path 2 is that employees
experiencing path 2 do not have a plan, and leave impulsively. The Pull Factors (path 3) is when
an employee witnesses a shock and compares their job to another job. This other job appears to
the dissatisfied employee unexpectedly. However, path 3 disregards job satisfaction, because
although one might be happy with their current job, if a better opportunity arises, they may
resign for the new job position. The difference between path 2 and 3 is that employees
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experiencing path 3 just had/found better alternatives to their current position and decided to quit
for a new job. In the last two paths (4a and 4b), dissatisfied employees do not experience a shock
and either quit immediately or first search for a new job then quit shortly after (Morrell, 2001).
As with all theories, the Unfolding Model has criticisms. The Unfolding Model suffers the same
problem as with all other turnover models as it is also weak in predicting turnover intentions and
at sometimes impractical. There is no finite model that would explain why employees quit. A
classic problem with the Unfolding Model is that the variables used to calculate and test this
model changes every study, making it difficult to determine which variables actually predict
turnover intention. Additionally, research often does not test all paths of the Unfolding Model or
does a poor job testing each path appropriately. According to Tae Heon Lee, “future research
needs to investigate a broader range of turnover paths to fully understand the complexities of
turnover behaviors implied by the unfolding model” (2013). The Unfolding Model does not
accurately capture all voluntary turnover intentions and only conceptually explains IG attrition.

The aforementioned variables commonly explain IG attrition but do not cover all cases. The
section below identifies outlier case studies that explain IG attrition outlier factors.

On October 19, 2017, New Orleans IG Ed Quatrevaux retired due to health reasons, and of
course is in search for a new candidate for his position. Quatrevaux’s Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations Howard Schwartz and Assistant Inspector General for Government
Performance Nadiene Van Dyke were both interested in Quatrevaux’s position. At this time,
Schwartz was investigating Van Dyke for steering agency contracts to friends, conducting audits
with unprofessional agendas, and terminating employees who disagreed with her decisions.
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Schwartz said he conducted the investigation on Van Dyke because it was his job to report
fraudulent activities, not because he wanted Quatrevaux’s job. This story spiraled out of control
and claims were made against Schwartz that he started the investigation because he wanted
Quatrevaux’s job and wanted to eliminate his competitor. Schwartz stated, “The idea that I did
this because I wanted Ed Quatrevaux’s job is preposterous” (2017).

Because of this investigation, Quatrevaux fired Schwartz and stated that his investigation claims
had no credibility. The irony of it all is that “it was Quatrevaux himself who told him to
scrutinize Van Dyke, Schwartz said. That came after an employee complained in March that Van
Dyke had undisclosed and inappropriate relationships with contractors working for the office and
had made other missteps” (Williams, 2017). Schwartz’s response to all this was “All I had to do
was nothing, he said. There would be no internal investigation. Ed Quatrevaux supports me for
this position. But I did that because it was the right thing to do. And it cost me my job”

(Williams, 2017). Shortly after the incident, Derry Harper was appointed as IG and Schwartz
was asked to resign on August 10, 2018.

On February 3, 2012, Houston, Texas’ Inspector General Roger Dogulm resigned after working
for 14 months. The OIG only received small complaints, such as selling tamales at a local police
department or discrimination claims. Dogulm attempted to investigative Jolanda Jones for using
city resources to fund her own private law practice, but once referred to the District Attorney’s
office; there was not enough evidence to prosecute Jones. “Doguim said he is leaving, in part, on
the principle that an inspector general should be a limited-term appointment. He said he also has
a family matter to attend to” (Moran, 2012). Although Dogulm claimed he had a family matter to
attend, he was dissatisfied with his job and quit two years into his appointment.
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Department of Veteran’s Affairs (VA) IG Jon Wooditch was caught masturbating on the job
multiple times each week in the VA OIG conference room. When DOI IG agents questioned
Wooditch, Wooditch denied all claims and said, “I do not admit to doing it. I don’t think I did
it… I don’t remember even being in there.” Wooditch also refused to take a polygraph exam,
claiming that he did not believe in the machine. Finally, the Daily Caller News Foundation called
Wooditch on his home phone, in which Wooditch responded, “I don’t have any comment at all. I
didn’t resign, I just retired. I don’t even know what you’re talking about. I’ve never heard that,
I’ve never done that.” In short, acts of public indecency also cause IGs to resign.

In short, many factors lead to IG attrition. Future research should identify and analyze the
normative and outlier causes of IG attrition to answer the research question: Why Inspectors
General Quit? This dissertation provides the framework for this future research question and
begins in the following chapter: Chapter 3 – Methodology.
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CHAPTER

3
Methodology

To analyze and solve the federal and state IG attrition problem, this dissertation project used
publically available semi-annual reports, media reports, and labor statistics to collect, analyze
and compare 2001 – 2017 federal and state IG attrition rates. This dissertation did not analyze IG
attrition rates from 2017 – present for the following reasons: The current presidential term will
provide incomplete information and cause incomplete attrition analyses. Additionally, U.S.
President Donald Trump has a strong adverse opinion of IGs and given his recent attempt to
terminate every federal IG in 2017, including IG attrition throughout his presidential term would
skew attrition averages. In short, this dissertation collected and analyzed IG attrition from the
past 16 years (Bush administration 2001 – 2008 and Obama administration 2009 – 2017) and
will analyze IG attrition under the Trump administration in future research.

This unit of analysis for this project is IG employment, which includes the hire/departure dates of
IGs. The AIGs, IGs, and Acting Inspectors General who become Inspectors General (AIGIGs)
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hire/departure dates were measured separately. These three IG categories were measured
separately between federal and state IGs. The selected states for this analysis are Florida, Illinois,
and New York and were measured independently and compared with each other throughout the
analysis. The independent variables are length of service, appointment type (federal IGs), and
law enforcement authority (federal IGs). The dependent variable for this project is IG attrition
and was measured using various attrition models identified in the literature review.

This dissertation started with collecting two sets of attrition data – agency and individual. The
sample sizes between federal and state IG attrition were not merged with each other and were
separate analyses. Both sets of data categorized IGs into AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs to prevent
overlap and double reporting. Only officially appointed IGs with public records identifying their
appointment were included in this analysis. AIGs that served on a short interim basis with no
public records identifying their position as AIG were not included in this analysis. Public records
include semi-annual reports, investigation/audit reports, and media coverage.

In the agency dataset, it will determine the attrition rates of AIG, IG, and AIGIG of federal,
Florida, Illinois, and NY State OIGs. This section will identify the federal and state IG term
duration and attrition rates between 2001 and 2017. Most federal, Florida, Illinois, and New
York state OIGs created after 1981 and remained active as of the end of 2017 served as the
sample size (1981 was when the first statewide OIG was created – Massachusetts OIG).
Discontinued state OIGs were excluded in this analysis. Research findings on the state OIGs in
this analysis were not assumed or applied to other state OIGs across the country. As mentioned
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before, although there is no empirical research on state IG attrition, this dissertation took the first
step towards analyzing federal and state IG attrition.

The agency dataset consisted of AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs from 2001 – 2017 for 68 federal OIGs
and 47 state OIGs (Florida, Illinois, NY). This dataset determined how many AIGs, IGs, and
AIGIGs an OIG appointed from 2001 – 2017. The rates of AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs were coded
as ratio variables. OIGs with the least or most IGs or with longer length of service rates were
also discussed in detail.

The individual dataset identified the AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs, for each of the selected federal,
Florida, Illinois, and NY State OIGs. The information collected for both datasets included IG
attrition rates from 2001 – 2017. Because some IGs were appointed before 2001 and continued
their service past 2001, they were also included in this analysis. The individual dataset also
included the hire and departure dates as well as the IG’s length of service. Due to possible
confusions in definitions between appointment dates, confirmation dates, hire dates, and start
dates, the year of when these events occurred were used for analysis. The year of when the IG
resigned from the OIG was also used to avoid confusions between resignation date, termination
date, and official last day at the office. For example, if an OIG appoints or terminates an IG on
November 6, 2014, only 2014 was used for analyses.

After completing the data collection for the agency and individual datasets, the methodology
section reported the following.
1. Total Number of IGs appointed
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2. AIG, IG, and AIGIG attrition per OIG
3. Length of Service separated by AIG, IG, and AIGIG
4. Length of Service separated by presidential terms
5. Length of Service separated by PAS/DFE (federal only)
6. Wastage Rate
7. Crude Employee Attrition
The IG attrition, employment duration, and calculated attrition rates reported rates starts with
federal IGs, followed by the combined total of Florida, Illinois, and New York attrition,
employment duration, and calculated attrition, and their rates separately per state.
The methodology chapter also highlighted the following on IG employment duration and
attrition from 2001 – 2017.
1. OIGs with the highest rates of attrition
2. IGs that served for more than one OIG.
3. IGs with the longest employment duration
4. AIGs who served as AIGs at the same OIG multiple time and not appointed to IG
Throughout determining attrition, employment duration, and calculated attrition for federal and
state IGs, the following statistical tests determined relationships between the following variables.
1. Independent Samples T-Test between Federal OIG appointment type (DFE/PAS) and
number of AIGs. Federal OIG appointment is a dichotomous variable and will serve as
the independent variable. DFE is coded as 0 and PAS is coded as 1. AIGs is a ratio
variable and will serve as the dependent variable. This statistical test will determine if
there is a relationship between federal OIG appointment types and rates of AIGs. If there
is a statistical relationship between the two variables, it is likely that depending on the
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appointment type for federal OIGs, there are more AIGs due to its feasibility and
perceived level of independence.
2. Chi-Square between Federal IG appointment dates by presidential term and their Length
of Service. Federal IG appointment dates by presidential term codes IG appointment
dates into one of the following categories: a) before 2001, b) 2001 – 2004, c) 2005 –
2008, d) 2009 – 2012, and e) 2013 – 2017. Length of Service is categorized into a) less
than 1 year, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, etc. IGs with a length of service more than 20 years
are grouped together. IGs hired and terminated within the same year will have their
length of service coded as “less than one year”. This statistical test will determine if there
is a relationship between federal IG appointment dates and if at the president at the time
of their employment affects the IG’s length of service. This test will also determine if IG
vacancy also shares the same results with Kempf’s research on decreases in OIG
productivity.
3. Chi-Square between Federal IG departure dates by presidential term and their Length of
Service. The codes for this statistical test will share the same codes as for the Federal IG
appointment dates by presidential terms and their Length of Service statistical test. This
test will determine if there is a general employment duration rate that IGs serve and
resign during certain presidential administrations due to external events.
4. Chi-Square between State IG appointment dates by presidential term and their Length of
Service. The coding structure for this statistical test will follow the same format as
outlined for #2. This statistical test will determine if there is a relationship between a state
IG appointment date and if at the president at the time of their employment affects the
IG’s length of service.
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5. Chi-Square between FL State IG appointment dates by presidential term and their Length
of Service. This statistical test is a subsection of #3. The coding structure for this
statistical test will follow the same format as outlined for #2. The purpose of this
statistical test is the same as #3.
6. Chi-Square between IL State IG appointment dates by presidential term and their Length
of Service. This statistical test is a subsection of #3. The coding structure for this
statistical test will follow the same format as outlined for #2. The purpose of this
statistical test is the same as #3.
7. This analysis will not include a Chi-Square test or Correlation test for New York State
appointment dates by presidential term and length of service as the same size is too small
for analysis.
8. Independent Samples T-Test between Federal OIGs having Law Enforcement Authority
(No/Yes) and rates of AIGs. Law Enforcement Authority is a dichotomous variable and
will serve as the independent variable. “No” will be coded as 0 and “Yes” will be coded
as 1. AIG rates will be a ratio variable. The purpose of this statistical test is to determine
if law enforcement authority makes the profession more difficult, thus affecting the rates
of AIGs.

Although IG service terms were categorized by presidential terms, it does not exactly mean the
president’s term completely caused the changes in attrition as it could be other external factors
occurring within the same period. To address this concern, statistical correlation tests determined
the strength of the statistical relationships. Presidential terms were used to categorize periods of
attrition activity and to address differences in appointment and departure dates of IGs. IGs are
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not appointed seasonally or in cohorts, which makes most attrition measurement instruments
inapplicable when measuring IG attrition. Using presidential terms as a framework for IG
appointment, departures, and attrition also guides future research in explaining the causes of IG
attrition due to political events during presidential terms. This dissertation collected and analyzed
federal and state IG employment duration and attrition and uses its findings to introduce topics
for future research.

After an analysis of IG attrition, a separate analysis of OIG statutes’ attributes determined if the
weaknesses in state IG legislature that would conceptually lead to IG attrition. This analysis
started with the Federal IG Act, followed by Florida Statute 20.055, IL Statutes 15 ILCS 305/14
and 5 ILCS 430/20-10, and NY Executive Law Article 4-A. The statutory analysis analyzed the
IG position qualification and vacancy requirements. This section also compared the position
qualifications and vacancy requirements between the IG Act, Florida, Illinois, and New York to
determine legislature weaknesses for policy recommendation. The final chapter of this
dissertation discussed policy recommendations for existing and future federal and state IGs.

The final chapter summarized the attrition and statutory analysis findings, identified current
legislature that affects IG employment and duration, and recommended best practices to reduce
IG attrition. The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, the IG Act, and the state IG statutes
Florida Statute 20.055, IL Statutes 15 ILCS 305/14 and 5 ILCS 430/20-10, and NY Executive
Law Article 4-A were analyzed for amendments to address IG attrition.
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In sum, the completed components below identified and solved the problem of federal and State
IG attrition.
1. A comprehensive internet search of federal and State IG semi-annual reports, media
reports, and labor statistics to determine IG attrition from 2001 – 2017.
2. Create two databases (agency and individual) using the gathered attrition data from #1.
3. Using data collected from #2, identify and determine the rates of IG employment duration
and attrition.
4. Analyze federal, Florida, Illinois, and NY state OIG statutes to identify weaknesses that
cause IG attrition.
5. Identify and recommend policy amendments to existing policy to improve IG
employment, attrition, and agency performance.

The final chapter in this dissertation recommended solutions to IG attrition.
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CHAPTER

4
Methodology Analysis and Findings

Out of the 73 United States federal OIGs, this dissertation selected 70 as its sample size to
represent the total (three OIGs were omitted from this analysis due to incomplete/unusable data).
Out of the 70 federal OIGs, 36 are designated federal entity/agency head (DFE) appointed and 34
are presidentially appointed (PAS). Within the selected 70 federal OIGs, 259 individuals filled
the IG positions from 2001 – 2017 and were officially appointed as AIGs, IGs, or were AIGIGs.
Deputy IGs that served shortly as AIG but not officially appointed were not included in this
analysis. Several federal OIGs appointed five or more IGs while most federal OIGs appointed
less than five from 2001 - 2017. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense OIG had eight
IGs from 2001 – 2018 while the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had two IGs.
The number of IGs that the 70 federal OIGs appointed from 2001 – 2017 is below.
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Graph 1 – Number of federal IGs appointed
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Note: Some individuals were appointed as federal IG in multiple OIGs.

The graph above shows most federal OIGs had two or three IGs from 2001 – 2017. 16 federal
OIGs had two IGs and 18 federal OIGs had three IGs. A few federal OIGs had one or eight IGs
from 2001 – 2017. Four federal OIGs had only one IG from 2001 – 2017. Five federal OIGs had
seven or eight appointed IGs from 2001 – 2017 are shown in the table below.

Table 1 – Federal OIGs with most appointed IGs
Federal OIGs with most appointed IGs
Federal OIG
Agency for International Development
Department of Defense
Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
National Endowment for the Arts

PAS/DFE Total IGs
PAS
PAS
PAS
DFE
DFE

8
8
7
7
7
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Three of the top five federal OIGs with the highest rates of appointed IGs were PAS while the
remaining two were designated federal entity appointed DFE. There could be a relationship
between presidentially appointed OIGs with high rates of IG attrition, which will be discussed
later.

Table 2 - Federal IGs who served in more than one federal OIG
Some federal IGs served in more than one federal OIG from 2001 – 2017. The federal IGs that
served for more than one year are below as well as their LOS. This list includes federal AIG/IG
for at least one year of service. OIG 1 is the first federal OIG served followed by OIG 2, the
second federal OIG served.
Name

OIG 1

OIG 1
DFE/PAS

OIG 1
LOS

OIG 2

OIG 2
DFE/PAS

OIG 2
LOS

Smithsonian
Institution
Harold Damelin Small Business
Administration
Clark Ervin
Department of State
and Broadcasting
Board of Governors
Glenn Fine
Department of
Justice

DFE

2 years

PAS

5 years

PAS

3 years

PAS

2 years

PAS

2 years

PAS

1 year

PAS

1 year

Department of
Labor
Department of
the Treasury
Department of
Homeland
Security
Department of
Defense

PAS

2 years

Phyllis Fong

Small Business
Administration

PAS

3 years

Department of
Agriculture

PAS

16 years

J. Russell
George

Corporation for
National and
Community Service

PAS

2 years

Treasury
PAS
Inspector General
for Tax
Administration

14 years

Peggy
Gustafson

Small Business
Administration

PAS

9 years

Department of
Commerce

1 year

Scott Dahl

PAS
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Gordon Heddell Department of
Labor

PAS

7 years

Department of
Defense

PAS

2 years

Carl Hoecker

U.S. Capitol Police

DFE

7 years

Securities and
Exchange
Commission

DFE

5 years

H. David Kotz

Peace Corps

DFE

1 year

Securities and
Exchange
Commission

DFE

5 years

Daniel
Levinson

General Services
Administration

PAS

4 years

Department of
Health and
Human Services

PAS

14 years

Steve Linick

Federal Housing
Finance Agency

DFE

3 years

Department of
State and
Broadcasting
Board of
Governors

PAS

5 years

Department of
Defense

PAS

3 years

Jon Rymer
Hubert Sparks

Federal Deposit
Insurance
Corporation
Denali Commission

PAS

7 years

DFE

2 years

Appalachian
Regional
Commission

DFE

7 years

Michael
Stephens

Department of
Housing and Urban
Development

PAS

1 year

Federal Housing
Finance Agency

DFE

1 year

Eric Thorson

Small Business
Administration

PAS

2 years

Department of
the Treasury

PAS

10 years

Adam Trzeciak

Federal Maritime
Commission

DFE

7 years

Government
Accountability
Office

DFE

5 years

David Williams

Treasury Inspector
General for Tax
Administration

PAS

3 years

U.S. Postal
Service

DFE

12 years
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Out of the 17 federal IGs listed above, nine of them started at a PAS OIG and continued their
service at another PAS OIG. Four out of the 17’s first federal OIG was DFE and with their
second federal OIG employment at a DFE. The remaining four switched from a DFE OIG to
PAS OIG or vice versa. There is a chance that serving at a PAS/DFE OIG will likely lead to a
preference in serving in a different OIG with the same appointment type.

Most of the federal IGs in this list started serving between 1-4 years in their first federal OIG and
in their second federal OIG, some served more than ten years, especially for the PAS OIGs. For
example, Phyllis Fong first served as IG in Small Business Administration and when appointed
as the Department of Agriculture’s IG, she served 16 years. Similarly, J. Russell George first
served two years in his first federal OIG position and 14 years in his second position. All the IGs
that served for more than ten years in their second position as federal IG were all PAS. In short,
it appears that federal IGs will have longer employment duration in their second federal IG PAS
IG experience after their first. Familiarity with the system, job responsibilities, and other factors
that were more difficult to handle during the IG’s first experience could explain the employment
duration of IGs’ second experience.

The breakdown of the IGs is AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs in the following three tables, starting with
AIGs. PAS and DFE appointment types are also included.
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Graph 2 – Federal AIG attrition per federal OIG
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From the graph above, we can see that 21 of the federal OIGs did not officially appoint an AIG
from 2001 – 2017. The federal OIG with the most AIGs (five) from 2001 – 2017 is Agency for
International Development. 27 of the federal OIGs only had one AIG at this time. In short, more
than half of the federal OIGs did not have any or just one AIG. It is possible that type of IG
appointment (DFE/PAS) causes AIG attrition and with statistical test results testing this
assumption below.

Table 3 – T-Test for Federal AIG count and appointment type
Independent Samples T-Test for Federal AIG count and appointment type
F

AIG
Count

Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

4.247

Levene’s Test
for Equality of
Variances Sig.
0.043

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference

4.604

68

.000

-1.188

0.258

-1.703

0.673

4.560

59.297

.000

-1.188

0.261

-1.709

0.667
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The independent variable for this test is federal IG appointment method (DFE/PAS coded as 0/1)
and the dependent variable was AIG count (ratio variable). The Student’s T-Test above shows us
a Levene’s Test significance value of 0.043, which means we should interpret the Equal
variances not assumed significance value (.000). This statistical test result shows that there is a
statistical relationship between type of federal IG appointment and number of appointed AIGs.
The strength of the statistical test is below using Eta Correlation.

Table 4 – Correlation for Federal AIG count and appointment type
Eta Correlation for Federal AIG count and appointment type
Value
Nominal by Interval Eta Appointment (0 = DFE/ 1 = PAS)
0.55
AIG Count
0.487
Because the dependent variable in this test is AIG Count (continuous variable), we will interpret
the .487 value, showing a moderate level relationship. In short, the type of IG appointment
(DFE/PAS) moderately affected the rates of AIGs from 2001 – 2017. Conceptually, PAS are less
likely to appoint AIGs and will be discussed later.

The statistical results here also share similar results to Kempf’s research, where DFE OIGs are
less productive in comparison to PAS OIGs. It is possible that DFE OIGs are less productive
because there were more appointed AIGs, causing difficulty in maintaining independence due to
a conflicting incentive to please the hiring official to be appointed permanent IG. With high rates
of AIGs, it decreases independence, staff morale and diminished aggression in audits and
investigations. “An IG who lacks independence cannot effectively fulfill the full range of
requirements for the office. Lacking this critical attribute, an audit organization’s work might be
classified as studies, research, consulting, or reviews, rather than independent audits”
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(Kepplinger, 2009). In short, there are many factors why DFE OIGs are less productive than PAS
OIGs.

Although there is a statistical relationship between federal IG appointment method and number
of AIGs, this is not the case for IG appointment method and IGs. The federal IG attrition rates
per federal OIG are below.

Graph 3 – Federal IG Attrition per federal OIG
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From the graph above, 23 of the federal OIGs had one IG, 19 federal OIGs had two IGs, and 16
federal OIGs had three IGs. In short, most federal OIGs from 2001 – 2017 had one to three
appointed IGs (this does not count prior appointment as AIG) and it appears that most federal
IGs have short LOS rates.
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Graph 4 – Federal AIGIG per federal OIG
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From the graph above on federal AIGIGs per federal OIG, more than half of the federal OIGs
(49) did not appoint AIGIGs. Only 17 federal OIGs only had one AIGIG from 2001 – 2017. The
federal OIG with three AIGs appointed to IGs is Federal Communications Commission. In short,
federal AIGs were unlikely to become appointed to IG from 2001 – 2017 regardless of
appointment method.

Below are the length of service (LOS) minimum, maximum, median, and mode of AIG, IG,
AIGIG employment duration for the 261 IGs from 2001 – 2017.

Table 5 – Federal IG Length of Service Overview

IG Category
AIG
IG
AIGIG

Federal IG Length of Service Overview
LOS minimum
LOS maximum
LOS median
>1 year
6 years
3 years
>1 year
28 years
14 years
1 year
17 years
9 years

LOS mode
>1 year
3 years
5 and 7 years
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From the table above, AIG, IGs, and AIGIGs at a minimum served one year from 2001 – 2017.
The longest employment duration for AIG is six years, for IG is 28 years, and for AIGIG is 17
years. The median LOS for AIG was three years, for IGs is 14 years, and for AIGIG is nine
years. Lastly, most AIGs from 2001 – 2017 served for less than one year, most IGs served for
three years, and most AIGIGs served either five or seven years. In short, federal IGs normally
serve between 1 – 7 years depending on their status as AIG, IG, or AIGIG.

Not all federal IGs serve between 1 – 7 years. Some appointed IGs served before and after our
period of study. The federal OIGs with one appointed IG from 2001 – 2017 are the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Postal Regulatory Commission, and Railroad Retirement Board and are
in the table below. The Postal Regulatory Commission (DFE) appointed Callender for 11 years
while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (PAS) and Railroad Retirement Board (PAS)
appointed Hubert Bell and Martin Dickman for over 20 years. Bell and Dickman were appointed
prior to the scope of our analysis (Bell was appointed on July 8, 1996 and Dickman was
appointed on October 14, 1994).

Table 6 – Federal IGs with longest employment duration
Federal IGs with longest employment duration
Federal OIG
PAS/DFE
Inspector General
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PAS
Hubert Bell

Length of Service
22 years

Postal Regulatory Commission

DFE

Jack Callender

11 years

Railroad Retirement Board

PAS

Martin Dickman

24 years

The table below illustrates total IG appointment and departure dates categorized by AIG, IG, and
AIGIG separated by presidential terms.
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Table 7 – Total Federal IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms
Total Federal IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms
>2001 2001 - 2004
AIG appointment
AIG departure
IG appointment
IG departure
AIGIG appointment
AIGIG departure
Total IG appointments
Total IG departures

2
2
38
3
9
2
49
7

26
22
27
18
6
3
59
43

2005 – 2008
20
19
32
27
4
5
56
51

2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017
14
12
21
22
8
5
43
39

23
20
28
27
1
4
52
51

Average
Employed
IGs
15

Total
85
75
146
97
28
19
259
191

25
5
44

Before President Bush’s first term in 2001, 38 IGs were appointed and since then, the IG
appointment rate never increased past 32. This analysis included IG appointment and departure
rates before 2001 because their service extended into the Bush and Obama administrations.
Excluding IG appointment and departure rates before 2001 would negatively affect the 2001 –
2004 appointment and departure rates and were included in this analysis. The highest IG
departure rate is in Bush’s second presidential term (27) and in Obama’s second presidential
term (27). There is also more IG appointments and departures under the Bush Administration in
comparison to the Obama administration. The following line graph illustrates the total IG
appointments and departures by presidential terms.
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Graph 5 – Total Federal IG appointments and departures by presidential terms
Total Federal IG Appointments and Departures by Presidential Terms
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Since Bush’s first presidential administration, the difference between total federal IG
appointments and departures decreased until the end of Obama’s second presidential
administration. It appears that federal IG appointments and departures may continue to share
similar rates or possibly higher rates of IG departures in future presidential terms. The following
statistical Chi-Square test determined a statistical relationship between federal IG appointment
dates and IG LOS.

Table 8 – Chi-Square Test for Federal appointment dates by presidential term and IG LOS
Chi-Square Test for Federal appointment dates by presidential term and IG LOS
Value
df
Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
103.980
20
0.000
Likelihood Ratio
114.427 20
0.000
N of Valid Cases
259
a. 2 cells (6.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.48.
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The variables for this test are IG appointment dates categorized by presidential term and federal
IG LOS (both nominal variables). IGs that were appointed prior to Bush’s first presidential term
(coded as >2001) were also included as their LOS extended into Bush’s first presidential term.
The Pearson Chi-Square test shows statistical significance between IG appointment dates by
presidential term and federal IG length of service. A Cramer’s V correlation test determined the
strength of this statistical significance below.

Table 9 – Correlation Test for Federal IG appointment dates and IG LOS
Cramer’s V Correlation Test for Federal IG appointment dates by presidential term and LOS

Nominal by Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V

N of Valid Cases

Value Approximate Significance
0.634
0.000
0.317
0.000
259

Cramer’s V’s value is interpreted instead of the Phi value due to the variable types. According to
the Cramer’s V value, it shows a weak relationship between federal IG appointment dates by
presidential term and federal IG LOS. This shows weak relationship between the variables and
inferencing that there a strong chance that other factors lead to federal IG LOS. Future research
will further explain this phenomenon.
Table 10 - Chi-Square Test for Federal departure dates by presidential term and IG LOS
Chi-Square Test for Federal departure dates by presidential term and IG LOS
Value
df
Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
44.959
30
0.039
Likelihood Ratio
49.793
30
0.013
N of Valid Cases
259
a. 16 cells (38.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .42.
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The variables for this Chi-Square test are IG departure dates categorized by presidential term and
federal IG LOS. Both variables are nominal and includes appointed IGs prior to Bush’s first
presidential term as they have resigned throughout Bush’s presidential term or even Obama’s
presidential term. The Pearson Chi-Square test shows statistical significance between IG
departure dates by presidential term and federal IG LOS. A Cramer’s V correlation test also
determined the strength of this statistical significance below.

Table 11 – Correlation Test for Federal IG departure dates and IG LOS
Cramer’s V Correlation Test for Federal IG departure dates by presidential term and LOS
Value Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal
Phi
0.417
0.039
Cramer's V
0.186
0.039
N of Valid Cases
259
Similar to the last correlation test, Cramer’s V’s value is interpreted instead of the Phi value due
to its variable types. According to the Cramer’s V value, it shows a very weak relationship
between federal IG departure dates by presidential term and federal IG LOS. This correlation test
shows a very small relationship exists between these two variables. Future research will better
explain how presidential terms would cause IGs to resign.

The breakdown of PAS and DFE length of services are in the following two tables.
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Table 12 – PAS IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms
Total PAS IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms
>2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008
AIG appointment
AIG departure
IG appointment
IG departure
AIGIG appointment
AIGIG departure
Total PAS IG appointments
Total PAS IG departures

1
1
17
3
4
0
22
4

22
18
14
8
4
2
40
28

2009 – 2012

2013 - 2017

10
9
10
10
3
3
23
22

16
13
10
9
0
3
26
25

14
14
15
13
0
2
29
29

Average
Total Employed
PAS IGs
63
11
55
66
11
43
11
2
10
140
24
111

PASs appointed more AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs under Bush’s first presidential term in comparison
to Obama’s first presidential term. Before Bush’s first term, there were 17 appointed IGs, the
highest IG appointment rate in comparison to 2001 – 2017. This analysis also included prior to
2001 PAS IG appointment and departure rates as their employment duration extended into the
2001 – 2004 category. From Bush’s second term and Obama’s first term, there were similar rates
of appointments and departures for AIGs and IGs as well as a decrease across all categories. This
table also shows 69 PAS IG appointments and 57 PAS IG departures under the Bush
administration and 49 PAS IG appointments and 47 PAS IG departures under the Obama
administration. In short, there were more PAS IG appointments and departures under the Bush
administration in comparison to the Obama administration. The line graph below illustrates PAS
IG appointments and departures by presidential administration.
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Graph 6 – Total PAS IG appointments and departures by presidential terms
PAS IG Appointments and Departures by Presidential Terms
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This line graph shows similar PAS IG appointment and departure rates since Bush’s second
presidential term, raising questions for future research. The table below depicts the total DFE IG
appointment and departure dates separated by presidential terms.

Table 13 – DFE IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms
Total DFE IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms
>2001 2001 - 2004
AIG appointment
AIG departure
IG appointment
IG departure
AIGIG appointment
AIGIG departure
Total DFE IG appointments
Total DFE IG departures

1
1
21
0
5
2
27
3

4
4
13
10
2
1
19
15

2005 – 2008
6
5
17
14
4
3
27
22

2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017
4
3
11
12
5
2
20
17

7
7
18
18
1
1
26
26

Total
22
20
80
54
17
9
119
83

69

Average
Employed
DFE IGs
4
13
3
20

The results from the PAS are similar to DFE. This analysis also included prior to 2001 DFE IG
appointment rates as their employment duration extended into the 2001 – 2004 category.
Between Bush’s second term and Obama’s first term, there is a decrease in appointment and
departure rates for AIGS and IGs. During Obama’s second term, AIG and IG appointment and
departure rates increased. Under the Bush administration, there were 46 DFE IG appointments
and 37 DFE IG departures. Under the Obama administration, there were 46 DFE IG
appointments and 43 DFE IG departures. Lastly, there were larger differences between
appointment and departure rates for PAS IGs than DFE IGs. The line graph below illustrates the
noticeable differences between DFE IG appointments and departures by presidential terms.

Graph 7 – Total DFE IG appointments and departures by presidential terms
DFE IG Appointments and Departures by Presidential Terms
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Although DFE IG appointments and departures follow the same trend as PAS IG appointments
and departures, the difference is wider for DFE IGs. Future research should explore the factors
between the differences here.
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In short, DFE and PAS IG appointment and departure rates are similar and share the same
attrition problem. There were more IG appointments and departures under the Bush
administration for PAS IGs (69 and 57) in comparison to DFE IGs (46 and 37) under the same
administration. Similar to Kempf’s research findings, OIGs were less productive during the
Obama administration in comparison to the Bush administration. This decrease in productivity
during the Obama administration also shares lower rates in IG appointments and departures,
specifically under PAS IGs. In short, not only were OIGs less productive under the Obama
administration, they were lower rates of attrition, which probably means the OIGs were less
aggressive in their audits and investigations. If OIGs are too aggressive or more productive as
they were under the Bush administration, there are much higher rates of IG attrition. Although
this is an explanation for IG attrition, other external factors such as “widespread house cleaning”
could have also occurred. Under the Bush administration, Paul Light even urged President Bush
to think twice about replacing the IGs serving under his administration and to keep them around
for continuity. This concern is not foreign because under presidential transitions, it is common to
“clean house” and attempt to fire all staff members (Lunney, 2001). This can also be another
argument to convert DFE OIGs to PAS OIGs as mentioned in the literature review and will be
discussed further in the policy recommendations chapter.

For federal OIGs, below are the AIGs who only served as AIGs and were not appointed to IGs’
LOS rates from 2001 – 2017.
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Graph 8 – Federal AIG Length of Service
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*Special IG for Afghanistan Reconstruction does not require Senate confirmation.

From the graph above, most federal OIGs from 2001 – 2017 either had an AIG that served for
less than one year (28) or served for one year (31). Out of the 28 IGs that served for less than one
year, 8 of them were at DFE OIGs while 20 were at PAS OIGs. The rates are similar for AIGs
serving for one year. Ten AIGs have served their current position for more than three years (3 –
6 years) and are all from PAS OIGs. In short, AIGs serving their position for extended periods
(more than three years) appears to occur within PAS OIGs and not DFE OIGs. The AIG with the
longest employment duration (six years) is Mary Kendall at the Department of the Interior.
Kendall was nominated to serve as IG in 2015 but the Senate never approved the nomination.

Below are the AIGs appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms. The
calculated IG Wastage rate is below and determined by the number of employees who resigned
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in a presidential term divided by the number of appointed IGs in the same presidential term,
multiplied by 100 to give us the attrition percentage.

Table 14 – Federal AIG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms
Federal AIG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms
Presidential Term
2001 - 2004
2005 – 2008
2009 – 2012
2013 - 2017
AIG Appointment
26
20
14
23
AIG Departure
22
19
12
20
Wastage Rate
85% attrition
95% attrition
86% attrition
87% attrition
During Bush’s first presidential term (2001 – 2004), 26 AIGs were appointed and 22 resigned,
calculating to 85% wastage rate. Bush’s second presidential term (2005 – 2008) calculated to
95% wastage rate and was the highest wastage rate in comparison to Obama’s first and second
term. The AIGs in this table only officially served as an AIG once from 2001 – 2017.
Below are federal IGs who were AIGs for the same agency multiple times at different times but
never appointed to IG from 2001 – 2017.
Table 15 – Federal AIGs never appointed to IG
Presidential
terms served

Name

Federal OIG

DFE/PAS

LOS 1

LOS 2

LOS 3

Joel Gallay

General Services
Administration

PAS

>1 year

>1
year

0

Peter
McClintock

Small Business
Administration

PAS

1 year

1 year

>1 year (Bush 2nd term)

Dennis
Schindel

Department of the
Treasury
Department of State
and Broadcasting
Board of Governors

Anne
Sigmund
Deborah
StoverSpringer

Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation

PAS

1 year

1 year

0

PAS

>1 year

>1
year

0

DFE

1 year

1 year

2 years

(Bush 1st term)
(Bush 2nd term)
(Bush 1st term)
(Bush 2nd term)
(Bush 1st term)
(Obama 1st term)
(Bush 1st term)
(Bush 1st term)
(Bush 1st term)
(Bush 2nd term)
(Obama 2nd term)

73

Except for Deborah Stover-Springer, the other four federal IGs served as PAS OIGs and served
at a year at most as AIG before returning to their previous position as Deputy or Assistant IG.
Most of the AIG terms were under the Bush administration. There also appears to be a
connection between AIGs and PAS OIGs serving multiple terms but never appointed to IG. In
short, depending on the type of presidential administration, AIGs may not be appointed to IGs,
regardless of their multiple appointments as AIGs.

For federal OIGs, below are the IG length of service rates from 2001 – 2017. This list does not
include IGs who previously served as AIGs in the same agency and appointed to IG. The Special
IG for Afghanistan Reconstruction was categorized under PAS.

Graph 9 – Federal IG Length of Service
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From the bar graph above, the norm length of service rate is three years, with 19 IGs serving for
three years from 2001 – 2017. The next norm length of service rate is two years, followed by five
years. 13 IGs who served seven-year terms and 12 IGs that served nine-year terms. Seven IGs
served 20+ year terms. There are more DFE IGs than PAS IGs, with more DFE IGs serving 10+
years compared to PAS IGs. The IG that served the longest term is A. Roy Lavik at Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (DFE) and served for 28 years. In short, it appears that DFE IGs
have longer employment duration than PAS IGs from 2001 – 2017.

The table below shows the appointment and departure dates of IGs as well as the calculated
wastage rate.
Table 16 – Federal IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms
Federal IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms
Presidential Term
2001 - 2004
2005 – 2008
2009 – 2012
2013 - 2017
IG Appointment
27
32
21
28
IG Departure
18
27
22
27
Wastage Rate
67% attrition 84% attrition 104% attrition 96% attrition
According to the table above explaining IG wastage rates from 2001 – 2017, the highest wastage
rates are during Bush’s second presidential term (2005 – 2008), and Obama’s first and second
presidential term (2009 – 2012 and 2013 – 2017).
For federal OIGs, below are the AIGIGs and their length of service from 2001 – 2017.
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Graph 10 – Federal AIGIG Length of Service
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From the graph above, AIGIGs served between 1 – 17 years from 2001 – 2017. Out of the 28
IGs, 17 are DFE appointed and 10 are PAS appointed. The findings here show that DFE OIGs
appoint more AIGIGs to IGs in comparison to PAS OIGs. The AIGIGs who only served for one
year are Clark Ervin at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security OIG and Glenn Fine at the
U.S. Department of Justice. In short, appointments to IG without first serving as AIG at the same
OIG may lead to longer terms.
Table 17 – Federal AIGIG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms
Federal AIGIG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms
Presidential Term
2001 - 2004
2005 – 2008
2009 – 2012
2013 - 2017
AIGIG Appointment
6
4
8
1
AIGIG Departure
3
5
5
4
Wastage Rate
50% attrition
125% attrition 63% attrition 400% attrition
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According to the table above, the highest wastage rates were during Bush’s second presidential
term and Obama’s second presidential term. Given the small sample size, Wastage Rates for
AIGIGs should not be compared to the AIG or IG Wastage Rates. Additionally, although federal
OIGs are required to appoint an AIG if an IG position is vacant, there are flaws with this process
that may have led to the low rates of AIGIG and will be discussed later. The Crude Employee
Attrition Model calculates IG attrition by dividing the average appointed IGs multiplied by 100
per presidential term. The equation results are in the table below.

Table 18 – Crude Employee Attrition Model for Federal IGs
Crude Employee Attrition Model (Federal IG departures/average appointed Federal IGs)
Position Type
2001 - 2004
2005 – 2008
2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017
AIG
146%
126%
80%
133%
IG
90%
135%
110%
135%
AIGIG
75%
125%
125%
100%
Total IG Attrition
110%
130%
100%
130%
The Crude Employee Attrition Model results show us that AIGs have the highest rates of
attrition in 2001 – 2004 (146%) and in 2013 – 2017 (133%). For IGs, the highest rates of attrition
are in 2005 – 2008 and 2013 – 2017 (135%). For AIGs appointed to IGs, the highest rates are in
2005 – 2008 and 2009 – 2012 (125%). Lastly, the total IG attrition rates are highest in 2005 –
2008 and 2013 – 2017 (130%). Overall, IG attrition was highest throughout presidential second
terms for Bush (2005 – 2008) and Obama (2013 – 2017). In short, it could be possible that
presidential transition is likely to cause IG attrition. Below are the total wastage rate percentages
for AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs.
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Table 19 – Federal IG Wastage rate

Presidential Term
Total IG appointments
Total IG departures
Total Wastage rate

Federal IG Wastage rate
2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008
59
56
43
51
73%
91%

2009 – 2012
43
39
91%

2013 - 2017
52
51
98%

From the total Wastage rate percentages since Obama’s second term, the wastage rate has
increased dramatically from 73% since Obama’s first term. The federal IG Wastage Rate results
are similar to the Crude Employee Attrition results, where the increase started from Bush’s
second term and continued until the end of the Obama Administration.

Based on our analysis of federal IGs, most federal AIGs served from less than one year to two
years from 2001 – 2017, with other federal AIGs that served towards six years. Federal IGs
normally serve two to three years while federal AIGIGs serve five to six years. The longest IG
employment duration is 28 years while the longest AIGIG employment duration is 17 years.
Lastly, a statistical test determined that there is a moderate relationship between IG appointment
type for federal OIGs and number of AIGs. Our results also found a statistical relationship
between federal AIG, IG, AND AIGIG appointment/departure dates by presidential terms and
the IGs’ LOS but this relationship is weak and future research will explain this problem.

For the analysis on State OIGs, 47 State OIGs (Florida, Illinois, and New York State) were
selected to represent state IG attrition because they are the top three states with the most State
OIGs (Exhibit 3). Out of the 47 State OIGs, there were 136 AIG/IG/AIGIGs from 2001 – 2017.
Out of the 136, there were 14 officially appointed AIGs, 118 IGs, and 5 AIGIGs. One of the IGs
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in this sample was re-appointed at their agency and was re-counted due to their reappointment.
The rates of AIGs, IGs, and AIGIGs for the 47 State OIGs are below.

Graph 11 – Number of IGs that FL, IL, and NY State OIGs appointed
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Note: This graph includes AIGs reappointed at the same agency.

Most State OIGs appointed between two to three IGs from 2001 – 2017. Many State OIGs
appointed only one IG within the same period. The State OIG with six to eight appointed IGs are
all Florida State OIGs.
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Table 20 – State IG Length of Service

IG Category
AIG
IG
AIGIG

State IG Length of Service
LOS minimum LOS maximum LOS median
>1 year
2 years
>1 year
>1 year
25 years
9 years
3 years
6 years
3 years

LOS mode
>1 year
2 years
3 years

State AIGs normally served from less than one year to two years and do not share the same
problem as federal AIGs serving for extended periods. State IGs have served from less than one
year to 25 years. Lastly, State AIGIGs served between three to six years with most of them
serving three years. The table below categorizes the State IG appointment and departure rates by
presidential terms.

Table 21 – State IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms
Total State IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms
>2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017
AIG appointment
0
3
4
1
6
AIG departure
0
1
4
3
4
IG appointment
24
22
22
31
19
IG departure
1
14
13
30
20
AIGIG appointment
0
1
0
2
2
AIGIG departure
0
0
1
0
0
Total IG appointments
24
26
26
34
27
Total IG departures
1
15
18
33
24

Total
15
13
124
83
5
2
144
98

According to the table above, there were few AIG appointments/departures and even less AIGIG
appointments/departures from 2001 – 2017. The following line graph specifically illustrates
these findings.
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Graph 12 – Total State IG appointments and departures by presidential terms
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Since Obama’s first presidential administration, the difference between total State IG
appointments and departures decreased until the end of Obama’s second administration. It
appears that State IG appointments and departures will continue to share the same rates in future
presidential administrations. These findings question the relationship between IG appointment
dates and IG LOS. The following Chi-Square test determined the statistical relationship between
the two variables below.

Table 22 – Chi-Square Test for State IG appointment dates and State IG LOS
Chi-Square Test for State IG appointment dates by presidential term and State IG LOS
Value
df
Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
63.460a
20
0.000
Likelihood Ratio
79.967
20
0.000
N of Valid Cases
137
a. 20 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.40.
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The variables for this Chi-Square test are State IG appointment dates by presidential terms and
State IG LOS. The State IG appointment dates variable has the following categories: a) before
2001, 2001 – 2004, 2005 – 2008, 2009 – 2012, and 2013 – 2017. Although the Chi-Square test
shows statistical significance, the Cramer’s V correlation test below tested the strength of the
relationship.

Table 23 – Correlation Test for State IG appointment dates and State IG LOS
Cramer’s V Correlation Test for State IG appointment dates by presidential term and State IG LOS
Value Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal Phi
0.68
0
Cramer's V
0.34
0
N of Valid Cases
137
A Cramer’s V correlation value of 0.34 is a weak positive correlation for this statistical
significance relationship. In short, depending on which presidential term an IG was appointed
would affect their LOS but slightly. It could also be external events occurring within the
presidential term that causes the statistical relationship and will be discussed in future research.
Average appointment rates per presidential term are three for AIG, 21 for IG, and 1 for AIGIG
and allow us to calculate the following Crude Employee Attrition for State IGs.

Table 24 – Chi-Square Test for State IG departure dates and State IG LOS
Chi-Square Test for State IG departure dates by presidential term and State IG LOS
Value
df
Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
26.417a 25
0.386
Likelihood Ratio
29.901 25
0.386
N of Valid Cases
137
a. 25 cells (69.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.
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The variables for this Chi-Square test are State IG departure dates by presidential terms and State
IG LOS. The State IG departure dates variable has the following categories: a) before 2001, 2001
– 2004, 2005 – 2008, 2009 – 2012, 2013 – 2017, and present (IG did not resign at the end of
2017). This Chi-Square test is not statistically significant which means there is no relationship
between an IG’s LOS and under which presidential term they resigned.

Table 25 – Crude Employee Attrition Model for State IGs
Crude Employee Attrition Model (State IG departures/average appointed IGs)
Position Type
>2001 2001 - 2004
2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017
AIG
0%
33%
133%
100%
133%
IG
33%
105%
105%
143%
95%
AIGIG
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%
Total IG Attrition
4%
60%
72%
132%
96%
The results from the Crude Employee Attrition Model find that total IG attrition was the highest
starting from Bush’s second presidential term to Obama’s first term and continuing into Obama’s
second term. These attrition patterns are the opposite in comparison to the federal IG Crude
Employee Attrition Rates. Below are the total wastage rate percentages for AIGs, IGs, and
AIGIGs.

Table 26 – State IG Wastage rate

Presidential Term
Total IG appointments
Total IG departures
Total Wastage rate

State IG Wastage rate
>2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008
24
26
26
1
15
18
4.20%
58%
69%

2009 – 2012
34
33
97%

2013 - 2017
27
24
89%

The Wastage Rate results are similar to the Crude Employee Attrition Model results where the
wastage rates are highest from 2005 – 2008 and continues onto 2013 – 2017. The breakdown
analysis of our results here are below starting with FL, then IL, and finally NY State IGs.
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This dissertation selected 31 FL State OIGs as its sample size to represent the total FL State
OIGs. Out of the selected 31 FL State OIGs, 10 AIGs and 90 IGs were appointed from 2001 –
2017. Not all FL State OIGs publically disclosed historical data to preserve confidentiality,
especially law enforcement agencies. From 2001 – 2017, there were no officially appointed
AIGIGs. AIGIGs that served as AIG for a brief period and not officially designated as AIG were
labeled as IG, resulting no officially reported FL AIGIGS from 2001 – 2017.

Graph 13 – Number of IGs that FL OIGs appointed
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The FL OIG that appointed eight IGs is the FL Department of Corrections and the FL OIG that
appointed seven IGs is the FL Department of Children and Families. 18 FL OIGs appointed two
to three IGs from 2001 – 2017.
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The following table illustrates a list of FL IGs who served in multiple FL OIGs as either AIG or
IG from 2001 – 2017 for at least a year. OIG 1 is the first federal OIG served followed by OIG 2,
the second federal OIG served, etc.

Table 27 – FL IGs that served in multiple FL OIGs
Name

OIG 1

OIG 1
LOS

OIG 2

OIG 2
LOS

OIG 3

OIG 3
LOS

Jim Boyd

Florida Supreme
Courts

4 years

Agency for Health
Care Administration

3 years

10 years

Dawn Case

Department of
Children and
Families
Florida Supreme
Courts

1 year

Department of
Children and
Families
State Board of
Administration

1 year
(returned)

Department of
Health (served
AHCA
simultaneously)
Office of Early
Learning
N/A

N/A

Department of
Financial Services
State Board of
Administration

3 years

1 year
(currently
serving)
7 years

N/A

N/A

2 years

N/A

N/A

Department of
Environmental
Protection
Office of the Chief
Inspector General

7 years

Department of
Community Affairs

3 years

Department of
State

2 years

4 years

6 years

N/A

N/A

Department of
Children and
Families
Department of
Health

1 year

State University
System of Florida
Board of Governors
Florida Housing
Finance Corporation

5 years

N/A

N/A

4 years

Department of Health

1 year

1 year

State University
System of Florida
Board of Governors
Department of Elder
Affairs

11 years

Department of
Transportation

>1 year

Agency for
Health Care
Administration
Department of
State

2 years

Office of Chief
Inspector General

6 years

State Board of
Administration
N/A

>1 year

N/A

N/A

Ken Chambers

Robert Clift
F. Marvin
Doyal
Candie Fuller
Derry Harper
Chris Hirst
Linda Keen

Joe
Maleszewski*
Melinda
Miguel**
Eric Miller

8 years

2 years

Department of
Transportation
Agency for Persons
with Disabilities

Agency for Health
Office of the Chief
6 years
1 year
Care Administration
Inspector General
Palm Beach County
Sheryl Steckler Department of
6 years
4 years
Children and
Families
*Joe Maleszewski also served as IG at the Department of Economic Opportunity for one year.

1 year

>1 year

N/A
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** Melinda Miguel also served as IG in many OIGs including federal.

Out of the listed FL IGs here, two IGs served the same LOS in both positions as IG. Five FL IGs
served a shorter term in their first appointment as IG and a longer term in their second
appointment. Six FL IGs served a longer term in their first appointment as IG and a shorter term
in their second appointment.

Graph 14 – Number of AIGs for each FL OIG
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From the graph above, only five FL OIGs had AIGs serving from 2001 – 2017. Most FL OIGs
do not officially appoint AIGs. It is likely that FL OIGs have AIGs but for a short LOS and was
normally unreported. It appears that appointing AIGs for an extended period is more apparent at
the federal level.
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Graph 15 – Number of IGs for each FL OIG
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From the graph above, most FL OIGs appointed two to three IGs from 2001 – 2017. The FL OIG
that had six IGs within this time was the FL Agency for Health Care Administration. In sum,
most FL OIGs do not appoint AIGs for extended periods. FL AIGs appointed to IGs (AIGIGs)
often have short transitional periods/almost effective immediately and unreported.
Table 28 – FL IG Length of Service overview

IG Category
AIG
IG

FL IG Length of Service overview
LOS minimum LOS maximum LOS median
>1 year
2 years
>1 year
>1 year
22 years
4 years

LOS mode
>1 year
1 year
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Most FL AIGs serve at their position for less than one year. The maximum LOS for AIGs is two
years. The few AIGs that served for two years were not appointed to IGs. Below is the
breakdown of FL IG LOS from 2001 – 2017.

Graph 16 – FL IG Length of Service
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From the table above, most FL IGs serve between one to three years and six years. An IG that
served within the 20+ years’ group is James Matthews at the FL Department of Economic
Opportunity. Tim Boyer served 22 years at the FL St. Johns River Water Management District.
Boyer also served as the Director of Management Audits before his position as IG from August
24, 1987 through September 30, 1994 and appointed IG on October 1, 1994. The table below
illustrates FL IG appointment/departure dates from 2001 – 2017.
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Table 29 – FL IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms
Total FL IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms
>2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017
AIG appointment
0
2
4
1
4
AIG departure
0
1
3
3
3
IG appointment
18
15
13
28
17
IG departure
0
12
9
24
17
AIGIG appointment
0
0
0
0
0
AIGIG departure
0
0
0
0
0
Total IG appointments
18
17
17
29
21
Total IG departures
0
13
12
27
20

Total
11
11
96
66
0
0
107
77

From the table above describing FL IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms,
the largest increase of FL IG appointment and departure is during Bush’s second term and during
Obama’s first term as president. The differences between the appointment and departure rates
slowly decreased over the presidential administrations. The line graph below illustrates this
finding.

Graph 17 – Total FL IG appointment and departures by presidential terms
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The relationship between FL IG appointment dates and FL IG LOS is statistically tested using
the Chi-Square test below.

Table 30 – Chi-Square Test for FL IG appointment dates and FL IG LOS
Chi-Square Test for FL IG appointment dates categorized by presidential terms and FL IG LOS
Value
df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
50.671a 20
0.000
Likelihood Ratio
63.575 20
0.000
N of Valid Cases
102
a. 27 cells (90.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.17
This Chi-Square test used FL IG hire dates categorized by presidential terms and FL IG LOS as
the independent and dependent variables. In statistically testing this relationship, our Chi-Square
test shows a statistical relationship between the variables. The Cramer’s V Correlation test
determines the strength of this statistical significance below.

Table 31 – Correlation Test for FL IG appointment dates and FL IG LOS
Cramer’s V Correlation Test for FL IG appointment dates by presidential term and FL IG LOS
Value Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal Phi
0.705
0.000
Cramer's V
0.352
0.000
N of Valid Cases
102
Given the variables types for this analysis, the Cramer’s V’s value shows a weak statistical
relationship. Similar to the previous Cramer’s V Correlation tests, there appears to be more
factors during the presidential term that causes the IG’s LOS. Future research will analyze the
strength of statistical relationships identified in this dissertation.
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Table 32 – Chi-Square Test for FL IG departure dates and FL IG LOS
Chi-Square Test for FL IG departure dates categorized by presidential terms and FL IG LOS
Value
df
Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
24.934
25
0.466
Likelihood Ratio
33.408 25
0.121
N of Valid Cases
102
a. 31 cells (86.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .34

This Chi-Square test determined no statistical relationship between FL IG departure dates
categorized by presidential term and their LOS. Future research should focus on factors that lead
to FL IG resignation and if there are certain times, where it is more prevalent.

An analysis of 31 FL State IG attrition found that most FL AIGs served for less than one year
and at a maximum of two years. Most IGs served one to three years, with the longest serving FL
IG’s LOS at 22 years. Lastly, there were no reported AIGIGs from 2001 – 2017, and if there
were, the term served as AIG was very short and unreported. Our results also found a weak
statistical relationship similar to the federal IGs, where FL IG appointment dates were
statistically significant to LOS but has a weak correlation.

This dissertation selected 11 IL State OIGs as its sample size to represent the total IL State OIGs.
Two IL OIGs that had four IGs appointed from 2001 – 2017 is the IL Department of Healthcare
and Family Services and Office of Executive Inspector General for the Agencies of the Illinois
Governor.
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Graph 18 – Number of IGs that IL OIGs appointed
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Out of the selected 11 IL OIGs, there were 3 appointed AIGs, 20 IGs, and 4 AIGIGs. Four IL
OIGs appointed one IG, while 6 OIGs appointed two to four IGs. Additionally, James Wright
served as IG in two different agencies. Wright served as the IG for the IL State Toll Highway
Authority OIG from October 2003 to June 2005 and as the IG for the IL Office of Executive
Inspector General for the Agencies of the Illinois Governor from July 2005 to September 2010.
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Graph 19 – Number of AIGs for each IL OIG
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According to the graph above and similar to the FL OIGs, most IL OIGs did not appoint an AIG
from 2001 – 2017. Only two IL OIGs appointed one AIG and the IL General Assembly, Office
of the Legislative Inspector General appointed two AIGs. The table below shows the number of
IGs appointed for each IL OIG.
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Graph 20 – Number of IGs for each IL OIG
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IL OIGs had between one to four IGs from 2001 – 2017. Five IL OIGs only had one appointed
IG within this period and four IL OIGs had two appointed IGs. Only two IL OIGs appointed
three to four IL IGs. The table below shows the number of AIGIGs for each IL OIG.
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Graph 21 – Number of AIGIGs for each IL OIG
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According to the graph above, most IL OIGs did not have AIGIGs from 2001 – 2017. The IL
OIGs that did have an AIGIG are the IL Department of Human Resources, IL Office of
Executive Inspector General for the Agencies of the Illinois Governor, and IL State Toll
Highway Authority OIG. Similar to FL AIGIGs, IL AIGIGs are also uncommon. The table
below depicts IL IG LOS rates.

Table 33 – IL IG Length of Service overview

IG Category
AIG
IG
AIGIG

IL IG Length of Service overview
LOS minimum LOS maximum LOS median
>1 year
2 years
1 year
2 years
25 years
5 years
3 years
6 years
3 years

LOS mode
>1 year
5 years
3 years

According to the IL IG LOS rates from 2001 – 2017, AIGs normally served between less than
one year to two years and as identified in the previous table, most of them were not appointed to
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IGs. The IL IG LOS minimum is two years with its maximum as 25 years. The IL IG with the
longest IG employment duration is Denise Kane at the Department of Children and Family
Services. Most IL IGs from 2001 – 2017 served up to five years. Lastly, AIGIGs served a
minimum of three years, a maximum of six years, and generally serve three years.

Table 34 Total IL IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms
Total IL IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms
>2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017
AIG appointment
0
1
0
0
2
AIG departure
0
0
1
0
1
IG appointment
1
5
2
1
7
IG departure
0
1
3
4
3
AIGIG appointment
0
1
0
1
2
AIGIG departure
0
0
1
0
0
Total IG appointments
1
9
5
3
5
Total IG departures
0
1
5
4
4

Total
3
2
17
12
4
2
24
16

The table above illustrates IL IG appointment and departure dates separated by presidential
appointments. Most IL IG appointments were during the second Bush administration and during
Obama’s first administration. The highest rates of IL IG departure was from 2009 – 2012. These
rates are similar to the federal OIGs during Bush’s second term and Obama’s first term, where
OIGs experienced the highest rates of attrition. The line graph below illustrates these findings.
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Graph 22 – Total IL IG appointments and departures by presidential terms
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IL IG appointment and departure rates do not share the same trend as federal or FL IG
appointment and departure rates. Future research should focus on the inconsistent differences
between the two rates. The Chi-Square test determining the statistical relationship between IL IG
appointment dates and IL IG LOS is below.

Table 35 – Chi-Square Test for IL IG appointment dates and IL IG LOS
Chi-Square Test for IL IG appointment dates by presidential terms and IL IG LOS
Value
df
Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
35.541a 16
0.003
Likelihood Ratio
35.500 16
0.003
N of Valid Cases
26
a. 25 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23.
The variables for this Chi-Square test are IL IG appointment dates categorized by presidential
terms and IL IG LOS rates. According to the statistical test above and sharing similar results to
the FL IG statistical test, IL IG appointment dates by presidential terms and IG LOS are
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statistically significant. The following Cramer’s V correlation determines the strength of this
statistical relationship.

Table 36 – Correlation Test for IL IG appointment dates and IL IG LOS
Cramer’s V Correlation Test for IL IG appointment dates by presidential term and IL IG LOS
Value Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal Phi
1.169
0.003
Cramer's V
0.585
0.003
N of Valid Cases
26
According to our Cramer’s V value, it shows that there is a moderate relationship (0.585)
between the two variables. This correlation test result should be analyzed lightly, as the sample
size is small and can only make conceptual inferences that there is a relationship between IL IG
appointment dates and IL IG LOS. The following test determines the relationship between IL IG
departure dates and IL IG LOS.

Table 37 – Chi-Square Test for IL IG departure dates and IL IG LOS
Chi-Square Test for IL IG appointment dates by presidential terms and IL IG LOS
Value
df
Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
26.125
20
0.162
Likelihood Ratio
31.140 20
0.052
N of Valid Cases
26
a. 30 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15.

According to the Chi-Square test results above, there is no statistical relationship between IL IG
appointment dates by presidential terms and IL IG LOS. Future research should focus on the
factors that affect IL IG LOS.
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Below are the rates of IL AIG, IG, and AIGIG attrition rates separated by presidential terms.
Wastage rate is not calculated because the rates are too low for accurate interpretation.

Table 38 – IL AIG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms
IL AIG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms
Presidential Term >2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017
AIG Appointment
0
1
0
0
2
AIG Departure
0
0
1
0
1

From the table above, there were only four IL AIG appointment from 2001- 2018, one departure
under Bush’s second term and another under Obama’s second term.

Table 39 – IL IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms
IL IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms
Presidential Term >2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017
IG Appointment
4
7
5
2
1
IG Departure
0
2
3
4
3
Under Bush’s first term, seven IL IGs were appointed during this time and five were appointed
under his second term. The appointment rates dropped throughout the Obama administration.
Throughout the two presidential terms, only one IL IG resigned.

Table 40 – IL AIGIG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms
IL AIGIG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms
Presidential Term
>2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017
AIGIG Appointment
0
1
0
1
2
AIGIG Departure
0
0
1
0
0
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During Obama’s second term, two IL AIGIGs were appointed. Throughout the two presidential
terms, only one IL AIGIG resigned in 2001 – 2017.

An analysis of 11 IL State OIGs found IL AIGs normally served for less than one year, at a
maximum length of two years. IL IGs normally served five years with a LOS maximum of 25
years. Lastly, IL AIGIGs normally serve three years at a maximum of six years. Similar to the
FL IG statistical test results, IL IG hire/departure date is statistically significant to their length of
service. In this statistical significance, there is moderate correlation; however, as mentioned
earlier this result should be examined lightly due to its low sample size.

This dissertation selected five NY State OIGs as its sample size to represent the total NY State
OIGs. From 2001 – 2017, there were no officially appointed NY state AIGs.

Graph 23 – Number of IGs that NY State OIGs appointed
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NY State OIGs appointed between 1 – 3 State OIGs from 2001 – 2017. Two NY State OIGs had
two IGs from 2001 – 2017 while one NY State OIG had three IGs.

Graph 24 – Number of IGs for each NY State OIG
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Similar to IL OIGs, NY State OIGs appointed 1 – 3 IGs from 2001 – 2017. Catherine Scott was
the only appointed NY State IG from 2001 – 2017. She also served as AIG for one year before
appointed to IG. Since her appointment in February 2012, Scott served at the NY State OIG for
five years.

Table 41 – NY IG Length of Service overview

IG Category
IG

NY IG Length of Service overview
LOS minimum LOS maximum LOS median
>1 year
18 years
5 years

LOS mode
N/A

Note: AIG and AIGIG Length of Service is removed as no AIGs were appointed and Catherine Scott was
the only AIGIG from 2001 – 2017.
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Kimberly O’Connor served for less than one year at the NY State Office of Medicaid Inspector
General and Sherill Spatz served for 18 years at the NY State Unified Court System OIG –
Judicial Appointments. The next NY State IG with the longest LOS is Barry Kluger, serving 11
years at the NY Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) OIG.

Table 42 – Total NY IG appointment and departure dates by presidential terms
Total NY IG appointment and departure dates categorized by presidential terms
>2001 2001 - 2004 2005 – 2008 2009 – 2012 2013 - 2017
AIG appointment
0
0
0
0
0
AIG departure
0
0
0
0
0
IG appointment
2
0
4
1
1
IG departure
1
0
1
2
0
AIGIG appointment
0
0
0
1
0
AIGIG departure
0
0
0
0
0
Total IG appointments
2
0
4
2
1
Total IG departures
1
0
1
2
0

Total
0
0
8
4
1
0
9
4

From the table above, most NY State IGs were appointed during the second Bush administration
and continued their service after 2017. Out of the five NY State OIGs, there were no reported
AIGs and only one reported AIGIG. NY State IGs normally serve for five years and a LOS
maximum of 18 years.
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Graph 25 – Total NY IG appointments and departures by presidential terms
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Although the sample size is low for NY State IGs, their appointment and departure rates are very
close to each other at the end of Obama’s second term. NY State IGs were not statistically tested
or analyzed further for appointment and departure trends due to its low sample size to avoid
misleading results. Future research should analyze the rates appointment and departure rates of
NY State IGs and compare their attrition rates to other state OIGs.

An analysis of the majority of FL, IL, and NY State IGs found low rates of AIGs and AIGIGs.
Reported AIGs served from less than one year to three years. The statistical test results were
similar to the federal IG test results, indicating statistical significance between hire dates and
LOS but with weak correlations. As mentioned before, a relationship between appointment date
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and LOS offers a possible explanation for the LOS duration. Other external factors not captured
in this analysis could explain LOS duration.

In short, the problem with AIGs serving for extended periods only exists at the federal level.
Federal AIGs can serve up to six years while State AIGs generally serve for short periods of time
with an IG appointment following shortly afterwards. There were also reported rates of State
AIGs serving at the same agency for multiple periods and never appointed to IGs. Lastly, IG
service period (hire/departure dates) is statistically significant to IG LOS rates.

This analysis on IG attrition encountered the following statistical limitations.
1) State IG attrition findings can only make inferences about attrition rates and problems in
other states outside of this analysis. Given the unique nature of each individual state,
generalizations may lead to misleading results and should be independently studied. For
example, findings from FL IG attrition rates cannot be generalized to Texas, California,
or other states.
2) Standard attrition models are normally used for large organizations and not for measuring
attrition rates similar to IGs with small sample sizes. Percentages produced by the
attrition models used in this analysis should not be compared with large organizations
and should only be compared to other similar organizations, such as other OIGs with
small sample sizes. Otherwise, a comparison between wastage rates from this analysis
and other studies will lead to misleading results. For example, it is not safe to assume that
80% wastage rate in an OIG holds the same attrition problems as 80% wastage rate in
Oklahoma Department of Corrections.
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3) Statistical tests in this dissertation held a low sample size due to the limited number of
existing IGs and OIGs. The federal and state OIGs analyzed in this dissertation project
are not merged together into one sample size and causes a low sample size for each
jurisdiction. These two OIGs categories cannot be merged together given their
differences in roles and responsibilities and were analyzed separately in this dissertation
project.
4) LOS analysis results are categorized by presidential terms but does not quite mean it is
the president’s term, presence, or actions that cause the IGs’ LOS. It is very possible that
external factors occurring within the same period have caused the changes in IG
appointments departures, and length of service, especially at the state jurisdiction.
5) This dissertation project does not capture all federal and state OIG and IG attrition rates
due to loss of data, poor record keeping, and confidentiality policies. However, the
samples collected are large enough to represent the entire population for each
jurisdiction.
6) AIG, IG, AIGIG appointment and departure dates are categorized and analyzed by year
due to loss of data, conflictions between hire, appointment, and official start dates, and
other related data complications.

Regardless of the statistical limitations, the methodology findings allowed us to identify the IG
attrition problem, leading to an analysis of their respective statutes for policy recommendations.
According to Paul Light, many IGs under the Carter and Reagan administration found their OIGs
upon arrival requiring major overhaul and was extremely short on staff. Many IGs found that
there was inflexible regulations, lack of rewards for staff, and high turnover among core
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employees (1993, p. 93). The Carter and Reagan administration IGs also claimed dealing with
Congress and the media to be the most difficult parts of their jobs. The major source of their
frustration stemmed from their agency resisting to change, lack of resources to perform their job
efficiently, the slowness of government decision making, and turnover of political employees
(1993, p. 97). Some of these OIG factors are likely to lead to IG attrition. Paul Light also found
IG attrition is caused by OIGs requiring major overhaul, the agency’s resistance to change, lack
of resources, slowness of government decision processes, and turnover of core/political
employees. Light’s finding lead to an analysis of federal and state OIG statutes, to solve the
following research question - What legislative, functional and structural attributes of inspector
general offices and the agencies they oversee are associated with different rates of employment
duration and attrition? This question prompts a discussion on the status of the Federal IG Act.

The only requirement as outlined in the IG Act to appoint IGs is that candidates must be selected
“without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated
ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or investigations.” This IG appointment requirement is too broad and does not
specifically outline qualification requirements such as types or levels of experience, education,
certifications, etc. IG positions now demand a wider skill set which includes and is not limited to
withstanding political pressure of agency employees, leadership, and promoting economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness of programs (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2018).

In the past, survey research by GAO has given us a basic understanding of who qualifies for a
federal IG position. In 1999, GAO conducted a research study on federal OIGs with 56
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respondents on operational and staffing issues. In fiscal year 1997, the 56 OIGs stated that 94%
of their staff worked in PASs and 6% of staff worked in DFEs. The staff consisted mostly of
auditors (45%) and investigators (26%). The remaining staff were administrative (11%), analysts
(7%), computer specialists (2%), attorneys (2%), and other (7%). Additionally, the most
common highest degree held by PAS and DFE OIG staff was a master’s degree in business
administration, followed by a Doctor of Jurisprudence (for DFEs). The next most common
highest degree held by PAS and DFE staff grouped into an “other” category, consisting of
finance, geography, psychology, and English. Lastly, the most common license held by federal
OIG staff was the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) (14% of PAS staff and 20% of DFE staff).
The second most common certification held was the Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE). In short,
since 1999, the norm qualifications to work at a federal OIG were to have an auditing or
investigation background, a master’s degree or Doctor of Jurisprudence, or a Certified Public
Accountant/Certified Fraud Examiner designation (GAO, 1999).

GAO’s study also reported 19 PAS IGs having met one of the position requirements as listed in
the IG Act – skill in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or investigations (1999). This study reported investigations (63%) being the main
background for PAS IGs followed by public administration (47%) and law (42%). Prior to
official appointment, PAS IGs had 6 to 32 years of experience in management, investigations, or
other IG related positions (GAO, 1999). For DFE IGs, auditing (61%) was the main background
instead of investigations like its presidential counterpart (most of the DFE IGs were previously
auditors before appointed to IG). The second main background of DFE IGs was management
analysis with only 21% of DFE IGs having an investigation background. In short, in 1999, PAS
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IGs predominantly had an investigation background while DFE IGs had an audit background
(GAO, 1999). Nowadays, it appears that both investigation and audit backgrounds are required to
be an efficient IG.

GAO’s 1999 study also reported the LOS and vacancies of IGs. Although they did not
differentiate AIG, IG, and AIGIG, this study showed that most PAS IGs served 3 to 5 years and
most DFE IGs served 0 to 2 years or 6 to 10 years. In 1998, nine IG positions were vacant with
seven being PAS IGs and two being DFE IGs. In short, research on IG LOS and vacancies
started since 1999. DFE IGs served either a short term or a very long term with IG vacancy being
a norm. “It is not unusual to have vacant IG positions” (GAO, 1999). It appears that IG vacancies
and attrition only became a recent phenomenon.

In a 2011 GAO study, 62 IGs were surveyed and reported having backgrounds and degrees in
accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, and
investigations. Most PAS IGs have a background in criminal justice, investigations, law
enforcement and public administration. Most DFE IGs have a background in inspections and
evaluations, criminal justice, investigations, law enforcement, accounting and auditing, and
financial analysis (GAO, 2011). In comparing academic degrees, 15 PAS and 12 DFE IGs held a
law degree. 12 DFE IGs held an accounting/auditing related degree. The other degrees that IGs
held were criminal justice/law enforcement related, management analysis, public administration,
and other (similar to the same social sciences in the 1999 study). In regards to professional
certifications, 28 DFE IGs reported having at least one professional certification while six PAS
IGs reported having one. “Of the DFE IGs, 6 reported they are certified public accountants and 6
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reported they are certified internal auditors” (GAO, 2011). Six DFE IGs reported having the
Certified Government Financial Managers certification and seven DFE IGs reported having a
certification not within the categories mentioned (Certified Information Officer, Certified
Information Security Officer, and Certified Inspector General®). In short, the norm to qualify for
an IG position is having an IG related background, academic or law degree, and a professional
certification. The “norm” attributes of past IGs can serve as the norm or “go-to” qualifications
for future IG appointments.

Some federal OIGs would require more strict qualification requirements, especially federal IGs
with law enforcement authority and are authorized in one of three methods – 1) the IG Act, 2)
the Attorney General, and 3) laws outside of the IG Act. There are currently 40 federal IGs that
have law enforcement authority, with 25 authorized by the IG Act, 10 authorized by the Attorney
General, and the last five authorized by external laws. Law enforcement authority includes the
following duties: a) carry a firearm while engaged in official duties, b) make an arrest without a
warrant while engaged in official duties, and c) seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of
premises, or seizure of evidence (Ginsberg, 2014). Law enforcement authority in OIGs also
includes additional job responsibilities. For example, “OIGs vested with law enforcement
authority through the IG Act must provide “periodic refresher training in trial processes; federal
criminal and civil legal updates; interviewing techniques and policy; law of arrest, search, and
seizure; and physical conditioning and defensive tactics” (Ginsberg, 2014). In short, OIGs with
law enforcement authority should have their legislature amended with stricter eligibility job
requirements.
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Law enforcement authority also raises the question if having this attribute would affect rates of
AIGs. The Student’s T-Test between the variables Law Enforcement Authority (0 = No/ 1 =
Yes) and AIG rates results (interval) are below.

Table 43 – Student’s T-Test for Law Enforcement Authority (Federal OIGs) and AIG rates
Independent Student’s T-Test for Law Enforcement Authority (Federal OIGs) and AIG rates

F

AIG
Count

Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

2.340

Levene’s
Test for
Equality
of
Variances
Sig.
0.131

t

df

Sig.
(2tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference

-2.985

68

0.004

-0.835

0.280

-1.393

-0.277

-3.062

67.993

0.003

-0.835

0.273

-1.379

-0.291

Based on the Independent Student’s T-Test results, there is a statistical relationship between
having law enforcement authority and rates of AIGs. The following Eta Correlation test shows
the strength of the statistical relationship below.

Table 44 – Correlation for Law Enforcement Authority (Federal OIGs) and AIG rates
Eta Correlation for Law Enforcement Authority (Federal OIGs) and AIG rates
Value
Nominal by Interval
Eta Law Enforcement Authority
.441
AIG Count
0.340

Because the dependent variable is AIG Count and interpreted instead of Law Enforcement
authority, the strength of this statistical significance is weak. It appears that although there is a
statistical relationship between federal OIGs with law enforcement authority and rates of federal
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AIGs, there are other factors that cause high rates of federal AIGs that are otherwise not included
in this study. Future research will focus on identifying causal factors for high rates of AIGs.

In short, the Federal IG Act and its amendments do not clearly describe the position eligibility
requirements, which have expanded heavily since its inception in 1978 and require further
amendments to include eligibility requirements. “Ideally, inspectors general should be appointed
through a process that leaves little doubt that the office will be run in an independent manner,
acting according to the rule of law, and not protecting the appointer” (Salkin, 2012). Salkin’s
aforementioned process should be detailed to ensure the strongest candidates are selected for the
positions. In short, without clear eligibility requirements, appointed IGs may be underqualified
for the job, which may cause IG attrition.

Although the IG Act does not include specified eligibility requirements for IGs, there are specific
details on removing an IG from office. According to H.R. 928 and S. 1723, “[a]n Inspector
General may be removed from office prior to the expiration of his or her term only on any of
the following grounds: (1) Permanent incapacity. (2) Inefficiency. (3) Neglect of duty. (4)
Malfeasance. (5) Conviction of a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.” The president can
also remove PAS IGs at any time for any reason. Although the president is required to explain their
reasons for removal, there is no deadline for their explanations. Additionally, Congress does not
need to notify in advance of an anticipated IG removal. According to Burrows, the only IG that has
a fixed term is the United States Postal Service IG. In short, little explanation is required to remove
federal IGs from office.
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The Association of Inspectors General’s Principles and Standards for Offices of Inspectors
General (Green Book) details the requirements of state and local OIGs. One of their first
requirements is that OIGs should be created as a legal entity, either by statute or by executive
order and should detail the following: a) Mandate, b) Authority, c) Powers, d) Confidentiality, e)
Staff Qualifications, f) Independence, and g) Whistleblower protection. Mandate is defined as
the OIGs’ mission, departments, programs, etc. Authority is the OIGs’ functions and
authorizations such as conducting audits and investigations. Powers is the OIGs’ access and
limitations on their ability to subpoena documents for investigations or access to records.
According to the Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity (CAPI), as of 2016, only six
states have searches and seizures, public hearings, and subpoena powers for their OIGs (2016).
Additionally, 18 states only have subpoena for their OIGs while 15 states have public hearings
and subpoena power (CAPI, 2016). OIGs must also maintain confidentiality of records and the
identities of persons who provided information to the OIG for ongoing audits and investigations
unless absolutely necessary to disclose to public. Additionally, the statute should outline the staff
qualification requirements for the IG and their staff to maintain independence and provide
protection to whistleblowers to provided complaints to the OIG. Given the value of following the
Green Book’s standards, State IGs have uniformly followed the Green Book’s recommendations
in establishing their OIGs across different agencies in the United States.

The Florida, IL, and NY State OIG statutes are similar and adopted many of the original
provisions from the Federal IG Act. Similar provisions included the organization mission and
objective, dual reporting responsibilities, and following professional standards in audits and
investigations. The IG appointment terms vary depending on the state. For examples, the
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California State IG is appointed to a six-year term and in New Jersey, the State IG is appointed
to a five-year term. Florida State IGs are appointed to four-year terms. Regardless of the fixed IG
terms per state, the IG removal processes varies from state to state. For example, Ohio State IGs
can only be removed only after written notice and giving the IG to provide a rebuttal. Texas State
IGs can only be removed with the approval of an external board and California State IGs and NY
State IGs can be removed only for cause. Unfortunately, Florida State IGs can easily be removed
as any other Senior Management Service employee and sometimes without cause and at the
discretion of the agency head (Bragg, 2010). Bragg recommends that Florida IG appointments
and removals should also be done in conjunction with a legislative committee, making it more
difficult to dismiss Florida State IGs and to reduce Florida state IG attrition.

According to Florida Statute 20.055 Agency Inspectors General, FL State IGs are required to
meet the following qualifications to serve as IGs.
1. A bachelor’s degree with a major in accounting or business with five courses in
accounting and five years of experience as an accountant, auditor (electronic data
processing, internal, independent post auditor), or a combination of the aforementioned
positions.
2. A master’s degree in accounting, business administration, or public administration with
four years of experience as an accountant, auditor (electronic data processing, internal,
independent post auditor), or a combination of the aforementioned positions.
3. A certified public accountant license or certified internal audit certificate issued by the
Institute of Internal Auditors.
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4. Florida IGs are selected based on integrity, leadership capability, background experiences
and is subject to a level-two background check.
5. Florida IGs must have at least five years of experience in the following areas: IG,
managerial experience in an OIG or OIG-like agency, law enforcement officer, court
judge, senior-level auditor/comptroller, administration and management of complex
audits and investigations, and managing fraud prevention and detection programs in
government or other organizations.
Lastly, when Florida IGs are appointed, they must have or be in the process of being certified as
an Inspector General with the Association of Inspectors General. Florida IGs must also have at
least one of the certification designations: Certified Inspector General®, Certified Inspector
General Auditor®, Certified Inspector General Investigator®, Certified Public Accountant,
Certified Internal Auditor, and many other related certifications. Unfortunately, “Most Inspectors
General are not qualified to perform assessments of state agency operations, and delegate this
authority to the agency internal audit director. This lack of expertise by Inspectors General limits
the ability of the OIG to identify opportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
government activities” (Hefren, 2010). According to Hefren, 25 out of the 37 Florida IGs in 2010
were not qualified for the IG positions they held. In short, although IG position requirements are
outlined in the Florida IG statute, it is not followed carefully and due to unqualified candidates
serving in these positions, it may be an explanation for Florida IG attrition.

In 2015, Florida Statute 20.055 Agency Inspectors General was amended with the following on
IG vacancy.
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Within 60 days after a vacancy or anticipated vacancy in the position of inspector
general, the agency head or, for agencies under the jurisdiction of the Governor, the Chief
Inspector General, shall initiate a national search for an inspector general and shall set the
salary of the inspector general. In the event of a vacancy in the position of inspector
general, the agency head or, for agencies under the jurisdiction of the Governor, the Chief
Inspector General, may appoint other office of inspector general management personnel
as interim inspector general until such time as a successor inspector general is appointed.
(Florida Statute 20.055)
This amendment addresses the need to appoint an AIG similarly to the Federal Vacancies
Reform Act of 1998; however, rates of FL AIGs have only increased marginally since. Unlike
the federal act, the FL statute does not impose an AIG to serve up to 210 days (or any amount of
days). Three conceptual explanations for the continued low rates of FL AIGs are as follows.

1) There is no need to officially appoint FL AIGs because FL IGs are easier to appoint in
comparison to federal IGs. This could be caused by the nature of governmental jurisdiction,
resources, and demand. If the appointment processes of FL IGs are easier than federal IGs, FL
AIGs are likely to serve for very short time periods and informally, reducing the need for official
FL AIG appointments and explaining the low rates.

2) Similar to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, the context that defines vacancy is unclear and
the Florida statute does not require an Acting official to serve a maximum of 210 days. The FL
statute vacancy amendment also states that the Chief Inspector General may appoint other office
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of inspector general management personnel as AIG. In short, it does not appear to be a
requirement or urgency for FL government officials to fill vacant FL State IG immediately.

3) The FL statute also mentions “anticipated vacancy”, which is broadly defined but can be
perceived as a proactive approach to ensure short FL IG vacancies, further reducing the need for
FL AIGs. Anticipated vacancy could be informal conversations that an IG is planning
resignation, retirement, or pressured into resignation. Given the broad definition of anticipated
vacancy, a clear definition should be included in the Federal Vacancies Reform Act to enforce
the proactive approach on long term AIGs.

The anticipated vacancy attribute in the Florida Statute is unique in comparison to the other
statutes because Florida State IGs are more likely to be terminated especially for just doing their
job too well. “Perhaps the most egregious example of an IG being removed for doing their job
was the removal of the IG at the Department of Corrections. This IG was removed by the new
agency head, James Crosby, and was told he was being removed in part because he had
investigated one of Crosby’s closest associates, AC Clark. Today both Crosby and Clark are in
federal prison for taking kickbacks from department vendors and contractors” (Bragg, 2010).
The following section analyzes the IL OIG statutes.
IL State has two types of IGs, Executive IGs and IGs and their statutes share many similarities
such as both positions serving five-year terms. Both statutes were effective in fall 2003. Below
are the list of qualifications required for IL IGs and IL Executive IGs under IL Statutes 15 ILCS
305/14 and 5 ILCS 430/20-10.
1. Convicted felons within the United States could not be appointed to IL IGs
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2. A bachelor’s degree
3. Five or more years of experiences in any or combination of the following fields: a)
federal, state, or local law enforcement with two years of investigatory experience, b) a
federal, state, or local prosecutor, and/or c) a federal, state, or local senior
manager/executive.
The Executive IG positions under 5 ILCS 430/20-10 also accepts experience as a member,
officer, or state or federal judge. Executive IL IG positions are appointed by three-fifths of
Senate consent while IL IGs are appointed by the Senate but does not share the same three-fifths
rule as Executive IGs. The Executive IG statute also does not have a vacancy rule as found in IL
Statute ILCS 305/14. As of 2018, there are low rates of IL State IGs (both executive and nonexecutive IGs) in comparison to Florida and federal OIGs, making it difficult to determine if it
would be meaningful to amend the Executive IG statute to include a vacancy rule similar to its
counterpart.

Under Illinois Statute Chapter 15. 305/14 also includes an AIG narrative similar to the FL statute
and is below.
The Inspector General shall serve a 5-year term. If no successor is appointed and
qualified upon the expiration of the Inspector General's term, the Office of Inspector
General is deemed vacant and the powers and duties under this Section may be exercised
only by an appointed and qualified interim Inspector General until a successor Inspector
General is appointed and qualified. If the General Assembly is not in session when a
vacancy in the Office of Inspector General occurs, the Secretary of State may appoint an
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interim Inspector General whose term shall expire 2 weeks after the next regularly
scheduled session day of the Senate. (Illinois Statute Chapter 15. 305/14)
According to the IL IG Statute, IGs serve five-year terms and AIGs are required to fill in vacant
IG positions. The AIGs’ term expires in two weeks and can be appointed by the Secretary of
State if the Senate is not in session. In short, IL AIGs are likely to be appointed, but are not
required, and will serve a significantly shorter term than the Federal Vacancies Reform Act.

According to New York State’s Executive Law Article 4-A, it outlines the establishment,
functions, powers, and responsibilities of the New York State IG. However, this statute does not
outline required qualifications or IG vacancy rules and is likely because there are only a few NY
State IGs. For future research, if there is an expansion of NY State OIGs, amendments to the
Executive Law Article should be made to outline qualification requirements and vacancy rules.
Lastly, the New York State Executive Law Article 4-A outlines the jurisdiction, establishment,
function, powers, and responsibilities of New York State IGs but does not discuss vacancy. A
conceptual explanation for this lack of narrative in comparison to the federal, Florida, and
Illinois jurisdictions is that New York State IGs is relatively new in comparison to the other
selected jurisdictions and has the least amount of OIGs, resulting in lower demand for AIGs. If
New York State adopts more state OIGs, it may eventually lead to the concern of more rates of
AIGs, AIGs serving for extended periods, and lastly, an amendment to the statute regarding IG
vacancy.

In short, there are many possible explanations why there are more AIGs at the federal level in
comparison to state. In following the AIG’s Green Book for best practices on hiring state IGs,
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there are variations in appointment, termination, and qualification requirements across states.
The FL State OIG statute appears to be the most detailed in terms of detailing the specific job
requirements and handling vacancies, followed by the IL State OIG statute and NY State OIG
statute. A likely explanation for FL’s statute (20.055) being the most detailed is because it was
established first (1994) in comparison to IL (2003) and NY (2013 for State IG). FL State IGs
also receive more media attention in comparison to IL and NY; possibly, because FL has the
most state IGs and are more likely to be subject to criticism. In short, regardless of the statutes’
attributes, they should be more detailed in their qualification requirements and vacancies. The
final dissertation chapter – Policy Measures to Improve IG Employment will discuss and
recommend amendments to IG position requirements and vacancies.
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CHAPTER

5
Policy Measures to Improve IG Employment

This chapter discusses current policy measures designed to reduce federal and state IG attrition,
starting with the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998. “One of the most glaring problems that
needs to be addressed is IG vacancies. Presidents have too few incentives to appoint strong
watchdogs, and instead leave the position vacant, sometimes for years” (POGO, 2018). In
POGO’s article, The Watchdogs after Forty Years: Recommendations for our Nation’s Federal
Inspectors General, they recommended that Congress amend the Federal Vacancies Reform Act
to create an alternative approach to appoint AIGs. POGO recommended Congress to designate
federal judges to appoint AIGs by a designated list from the CIGIE or to designate an executive
body to appoint IGs when presidential appointment is not an option. Additionally, POGO
recommended that Congress also amend the Federal Vacancies Reform Act to include a
requirement for the White House to explain to Congress why a vacant IG position has exceeded
210 days and to provide a nomination date (POGO, 2018).
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The Federal Vacancies Reform Act requires vacant positions that require presidential
appointment and Senate confirmation to be filled by an Acting official for up to 210 days (seven
months). Qualified Acting officials can be any of the following: a) The first assistant to the office
(Deputy IG or similar title), b) a different person serving in another Senate confirmed position,
or c) senior employee within the same agency with a GS-15 pay scale or higher. In short, the
PAS IG positions should not have AIGs serving for more than seven months. Unfortunately from
2001 – 2018, 20 PAS IGs have served for more than one year, 11 serving up to two years, and
ten AIGs serving between three to six years.

The Federal Vacancies Reform Act is not followed carefully because its language is flawed and
unclear. “The act doesn’t go into effect unless an executive officer “dies, resigns, or is otherwise
unable to perform the functions and duties of the office.” There isn’t specific language about the
scenario where an office is terminated or fired from a position” (Bomboy, 2018). More
importantly, the Act does not define who qualifies as “the first assistant” to serve as AIG. This
recent discussion on the Act was caused by Rod Rosenstein’s possible departure from
Washington, and identified the problem with the Act’s undefined language in determining an
acting replacement due to someone’s departure. In short, although the Act applies to federal IGs,
the undefined language makes it difficult to find and appoint a federal AIG after a federal IG’s
departure.

Although unclear, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act helped increase awareness on the growing
rates of federal AIGs serving for extended periods. If the legislature did not require PAS OIGs to
officially appoint AIGs, Deputy IGs serving as AIGs for extended periods would go unnoticed
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especially if given an informal but not official AIG title. Since the creation of the Reform Act in
1998, AIG appointment rates in 2001 – 2004 increased to 26 from two prior to 2001. In other
words, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 required the official appointment of AIGs in
federal agencies, and exposed the OIGs with AIGs starting as early as 2001.

In short, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act will need to be amended to address IG vacancies.
Amendment options include making the language more clear on what defines vacancy and what
would qualify as vacancy. For example, the confusion between being asked to resign or
termination should both hold the same definition. The Act should also specify who would qualify
as a First Assistant, such as providing title examples such as Deputy IG, First Assistant IG, etc.
Lastly, the Act should enforce the 210 days rule as suggested by POGO or at least require the
White House provide an explanation.

“GAO and the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency, which preceded the Council of
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), had found that the internal audit offices
of small federal agencies lacked independence and provided inadequate coverage of important
programs that could benefit from independent oversight by an IG” (Davis, 2014). This lack of
independence can be resolved by following Burrows’ recommendation, where DFE IGs should
be converted to PAS IGs. The conversion from DFE to PAS should increase independence,
efficiency, effectiveness, and may reduce the reported AIG attrition problem. This will also
address the DFE OIG productiveness problem Kempf has identified in her research. As
recommended by GAO, below are their alternatives to converting DFE OIGs to PAS OIGs to
reduce IG attrition.
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1. Converting some DFE IGs to PAS IGs,
2. Converting all DFE IGs into PAS IGs.
3. Converting some or all DFE IGs into PAS IGs but including a sunset provision.
The best approach is to continue converting DFE IGs into PAS IGs to eventually have all federal
IGs as PAS IGs. GAO reported “some concerns about creating and maintaining small IG offices
with limited resources, where an IG might not have the ability to obtain the technical skills and
expertise needed to provide adequate and cost- effective oversight. In the final analysis, the
determination of whether to place IGs in specific agencies is a policy decision to be decided by
the Congress” (Davis, 2014). It short, it is more than just an increase in independence for federal
IGs if they were all converted to PAS. There already exists a concern on maintaining DFE OIGs
based on budget and staff qualifications. This is also another argument that the current IG Act
should be amended to include specific qualification requirements.

In sum, if all DFE IGs are converted to PAS, federal IGs will become more efficient, effective,
independent, and productive. The procedure for conversion should be the same for the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Tennessee Valley Authority, as both agencies had
successful transitions. For DFEs without IGs, they should receive oversight from the PAS OIGs
on a case-by-case basis instead of either appointing a DFE IG or having another DFE OIG
provide oversight on a case-by-case basis. This movement will reduce the current rates of DFE
OIGs and to reduce the need for DFE OIGs to have oversight over multiple DFEs.

If the Federal Vacancies Reform Act can be amended to reduce IG attrition, the legislature
narrative and process should be adopted at the state legislature. For the FL, IL, and NY State
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OIG Statutes (Florida Statute 20.055, Illinois Statute Chapter 15. 305/14, New York State
Executive Law Article 4-A), they should be amended to include the following:
a) the need to appoint an AIG when an IG position is vacant or is anticipated to be
vacant. Anticipated vacancy should also be clearly defined to avoid the same challenges
b) appointed AIGs should only serve a set time period and should be monitored
c) qualified persons to serve as AIGs should be detailed similar to FL Statute 20.055
d) required qualifications to appoint IGs
e) standardized procedures on removing IGs from office
These IG vacancy amendments should increase awareness on reducing IG attrition and cause an
increase in reported AIGs, allowing agencies to monitor AIGs’ LOS to ensure vacancies are
short-termed.

Lastly, OIGs should take initiative in measuring performance or using their performance
analytics to determine the effectiveness of their offices. Performance analytics should include
“live-time” data, where information is captured without breaks for audits and investigations. This
would not only improve the office’s output but also help determine the loss of productivity when
an IG position is vacant for extended periods. Performance analytics should start with addressing
and resolving the IG’s TMPC. Once the major challenges are resolved, performance analytics
should be used in important decision-making to improve overall IG performance. IGs who have
performance data to make important decisions will have more control over agency outcomes,
which may reduce IG attrition.
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CHAPTER

6
Conclusions and Future Research

This dissertation topic started with GAO’s report Inspectors General Information on Vacancies
and IG Community Views on Their Impact, discussing the growing concerns of federal IG
vacancies for extended periods, leading to AIGs serving terms longer than intended, which
reduces efficiency and effectiveness of their OIGs. This discussion has led to further review of
federal IGs along with their IG Act, PAS/DFE IGs, and factors that may cause IG attrition.
Conceptual explanations for IG attrition in forms of theories or case studies segued to the
methodology chapter to measure IG attrition. This dissertation collected and analyzed federal
and state IG attrition from 2001 – 2017, using publically available data consisting of and not
limited to IG semi-annual reports, media reports, and labor statistics.

This dissertation’s methodology started with collecting and compiling two attrition datasets –
agency and individual. The agency dataset focused on IG attrition rates for each of the OIGs
selected for this analysis. IGs were categorized into AIG, IG, and AIGIG for clarity and to
125

prevent duplicate reporting of records. Due to loss of data and confusions between appointment,
confirmed, hire, and start dates, analyses in this dissertation only used the reported year of when
these events occurred. The analyses in this dissertation also used departure year to avoid
confusion in termination, resignation, and last reported working day in office dates. This
dissertation methodology reported IG attrition, LOS, and wastage rates to illustrate where IG
attrition stands at the end of the Bush and Obama administrations. Following the attrition section,
an analysis of federal and state statutes found that existing legislature on IG attrition is unclear
and requires amendment. Chapter 5 recommended amendments to the Federal Vacancies Reform
Act, conversion from DFE IGs to PAS IGs, and amendments to the state legislatures to detail
qualifications and approaches towards addressing vacant IG positions.

In short, this dissertation concludes the following on IG attrition.
1. IG attrition is a problem for federal OIGs and is recognized by the CIGIE, GAO, POGO,
and other organizations that monitor federal IGs.
2. AIGs serving for extended periods is a problem for federal OIGs and not state OIGs.
3. IG attrition is not a problem for state OIGs, given their low rates of AIGs.
4. There is limited academic research on IG attrition. Existing literature only analyzes
federal IGs.
5. Measuring IG attrition is challenging given the unique nature of OIGs and staff
composition in comparison to other professions.
6. Measuring the impact of IG attrition is challenging. An approach towards measuring IG
attrition impacts starts with performance analytics, which is usually not implemented or
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used in OIGs. Once an OIG uses performance analytics, they can measure output
differences during periods of IG vacancy.
7. Empirical theories can only partially explain the causes of IG attrition.
8. IG LOS varies by presidential term regardless if it is federal or state jurisdiction.
9. Federal OIG law enforcement authority has a statistical relationship with rates of federal
AIGs.
10. The properties of the amended IG Act, FL, IL, and NY state IG legislature barely address
the job position requirements and attrition.
11. Policy recommendations to reduce IG attrition are the following:
a. Amendments to the Federal Vacancies Act, IG Act, and state IG statutes to
properly define and address IG attrition. These amendments should clearly
explain the roles of a Deputy IG during an IG vacancy and requirements to
appoint an official IG within a short period.
b. Conversion from DFE to PAS OIGs to increase IG independence. Independence
is essential for IGs and IGs without independence are likely to resign.
c. OIGs should use performance measurement analytics to improve effectiveness of
their offices. Analyzing OIG performance is critical for IGs to make important
decisions, allowing them to effectively accomplish organization goals. IGs who
are unable to accomplish organization goals are likely to resign.
The conclusions of this research project only addressed IG attrition from 2001 – 2017. Future
research on IG attrition should focus on the statistical test results covered in this dissertation,
amendments to the IG Act and state IG legislatures, IG attrition of other states not mentioned in
this analysis, and performance measurement for IG offices with high rates of attrition.
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Additionally, future research should focus on the statistical significant relationships in this
dissertation, such as the events during presidential terms to explain IG attrition. A sample
research question is “What events under the Bush or Obama administration causes IG attrition?”
A qualitative case study on political events under different presidential administrations can
conceptually explain IG attrition. Another research question can focus on IG legislature, and
forecasted amendments to reduce IG attrition. Amendment examples include addressing IG job
requirements, vacant IG positions, and processes for anticipated vacant IG positions. The federal
IG Act and state IG statutes should ensure that it clearly defines the word “attrition” and not
repeat the same challenges that the Federal Vacancies Reform Act is encountering now. With
enough research on IG legislature at the state jurisdiction, it may eventually lead to new
legislature that is applied to all state IGs similar to the IG Act.

Future research on IG attrition should identify and analyze potential causal factors tied to
political events. Causal factors for IG attrition includes budget, expenditures, fiscal health, along
with other sociodemographic variables, similar to CAPI’s survey research on oversight
institutions (2016). These causal factors can affect attrition as well as IG LOS. Most literature
and reports on IG attrition only focus on federal OIGs, with little research on OIGs in other
governmental jurisdictions. Additionally, there are no attrition measurements instruments
designed specifically for OIGs and should be explored further to create a unique attrition formula
just for OIGs. Future research should avoid the use of standard attrition and other similar
measurement models as explained in the literature review.
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Unique characteristics of OIGs such as law enforcement authority should be researched further
to determine if they lead to IG attrition. Some examples include OIG budget, subpoena power,
special training programs, and increased independence or jurisdiction. Future research on this
topic should start with federal OIGs, followed by state and local OIGs. Local OIG attrition
should also be a future research topic, and given its minimal publicity in comparison to federal
and state OIGs, a case-by-case qualitative analysis will determine if IG attrition exists at the local
jurisdiction.

Another future research topic should be on IG performance measurement. Performance
measurement of IGs should stray away from the use of ROI reports because it focuses on
program outputs and not program outcomes and other instruments should be used to measure IG
performance. The role of the OIG is to improve its efficiency and effectiveness instead of
prioritizing the number of dollars saved. Dollars saved can be a sub-section of efficiency but not
a complete measurement. Additionally, not all offices have performance data, nor do they have
systems or processes to collect data. OIGs should have performance data analytics and use the
analytics for important organization decisions. For OIGs that already have performance data
analytics and use the data for operations, they should have “live-time” access to the information
to streamline audits and investigations. With the use of IG performance measurement data, it can
also conceptually explain IG attrition.

Lastly, there were numerous future research topics on state IG attrition identified in this
dissertation. The first research topic should focus on the remaining State OIGs not included in
this analysis. This research topic should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis given the unique
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nature of each state jurisdiction. The second research topic can focus on why some states have
state OIGs while other states do not. This research topic can start with identifying states that do
not have a statewide OIG but have state OIGs who informally represent as the state OIG. The
third research topic should focus on state AIGs and why AIGs is a norm at the federal level and
not the state level. Finally, the last future research topic introduced in this dissertation should
measure IG attrition under the Trump and future presidential administrations.
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APPENDIX
Exhibit 1a – Presidentially appointed Federal OIGs
● Corporation for National and Community Service
● Department of Agriculture
● Department of Commerce
● Department of Defense
● Department of Education
● Department of Energy
● Department of Health and Human Services
● Department of Homeland Security
● Department of Housing and Urban Development
● Department of the Interior
● Department of Justice
● Department of Labor
● Department of State
● Department of Transportation
● Department of the Treasury
● Department of Veterans Affairs
● Environmental Protection Agency
● Export-Import Bank
● Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
● Federal Housing Finance Agency
● General Services Administration
● National Aeronautics and Space Administration
● National Reconnaissance Office
● National Security Agency
● Nuclear Regulatory Commission
● Office of Personnel Management
● Railroad Retirement Board
● Small Business Administration
● Social Security Administration
● Tennessee Valley Authority
● Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
● U.S. Agency for International Development
Exhibit 1b – Agency appointed Federal OIGs
● Amtrak
● Appalachian Regional Commission
● Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection
● Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled (Ability One
Program)
● Commodity Futures Trading Commission
● Consumer Product Safety Commission
● Corporation for Public Broadcasting
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●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

Defense Intelligence Agency
Denali Commission
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Election Commission
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Trade Commission
Legal Services Corporation
National Archives and Records Administration
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Endowment for the Humanities
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
National Labor Relations Board
National Science Foundation
Peace Corps
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Postal Regulatory Commission
Securities and Exchange Commission
Smithsonian Institution
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
U.S. International Trade Commission
U.S. Postal Service

Exhibit 2 – Florida, Illinois, and New York State OIGs
Florida
● Agency for Health Care Administration Office of the Inspector General
● Agency for Persons with Disabilities
● Agency for Workplace Innovation
● Board of Governors
● Chief Inspector General
● Citizens Property Insurance Corporation Office of Inspector General
● Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Inspector General
● Department of Business & Professional Regulation Office of Inspector General
● Department of Children and Families Office of Inspector General
● Department of Citrus
● Department of Corrections Office of Inspector General
● Department of Economic Opportunity Office of Inspector General
● Department of Education Office of Inspector General
● Department of Elder Affairs Office of Inspector General
● Department of Environmental Protection Office of Inspector General
● Department of Financial Services
● Department of Health Office of Inspector General
● Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Office of Inspector General
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●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

Department of Juvenile Justice Office of Inspector General
Department of Law Enforcement Office of Inspector General
Department of Lottery Office of Inspector General
Department of Management Services Office of Inspector General
Department of Revenue Office of Inspector General
Department of State
Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General
Department of Veterans' Affairs Office of Inspector General
Division of Emergency Management Office of Inspector General
Executive Office of Governor Rick Scott
Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Office of Inspector General
Florida Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Office of Inspector General
Florida University Office of Inspector General
Housing Finance Corporation Office of Inspector General
International University
Office of Attorney General Office of Inspector General
Office of Early Learning Office of Inspector General
Office of Financial Regulation
Office of Insurance Regulation Office of Inspector General
Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court and Comptroller
Public Service Commission
State Board of Administration
Supreme Court of Florida Office of the Inspector General
Water Management District Office of Inspector General

Illinois
● Auditor General
● Comptroller
● Department of Children and Family Services
● Department of Healthcare and Family Services
● Department of Human Resources
● General Assembly, Legislative Inspector General
● Office of Executive Inspector General for the Agencies of the Illinois Governor
● Office of Executive Inspector General for the Illinois State Treasurer
● Office of the Inspector General for the Attorney General
● Secretary of State Office of Inspector General
● State Toll Highway Authority Office of the Inspector General
New York State
● Department of Corrections and Community Supervision Office of Special Investigations
● Dormitory Authority Office of Internal Affairs
● MTA Office of Inspector General
● NY State Unified Court System Office of Inspector General
● Office of Medicaid Inspector General
● Office of Welfare Office of Inspector General
● State Comptroller
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● State Inspector General
● Workers Compensation Office of Inspector General
Exhibit 3 – State OIGs in the United States (2017)

Map created by Tableau Public
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